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ABSTRACT 
 
 
After the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union new 
threats and opportunities filled the international relations’ system. New regions of 
the previously mighty empire began to attract attention of the West. The only 
remaining superpower, the United States, had nearly the duty to engage more 
actively with these new regions. The South Caucasus was the area, which was not 
considered appealing as a geopolitical priority during the 20th century.  
The situation has changed, however, with the region’s geostrategic 
significance revealed again as the colony status of the local states vanished in the 
haze of the revolutionary movements of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, 
the region’s attractiveness for the West in general and for the United States in 
particular became clear after new oil and gas reserves came to agenda. Economic 
development and security framework have been connected with each other very 
tight here and it were the US policies that determined to a large extent the fate of the 
region in the international system.  
The paper aims to examine the main directions of the American policy in the 
region and to show the positive sides as well as some drawbacks of the policy in 
question. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
Soğuk Savaşın sona ermesinden ve Sovyetler Birliği’nin parçalanmasından 
sonra uluslararası sistemde yeni tehlikeler ve fırsatlar ortaya çıktı. Eskiden kuvvetli 
olan Sovyetler Birliği’nin cumhuriyetleri Batı’nın dikkatini çekmeye başladı. Tek 
süpergüç, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri bu yeni bölgelerle etkili bir şekilde 
ilgilenmeye başladı. Yirmincı yüzyıl boyunca Güney Kakfasya jeopolitik tercih 
olarak çeşitli sebeplerden dolayı ilgi çekmeyen bir alandı. Sovyetler Birliği’nin 
yıkılması ile durum değişti, 1980li yılların sonunda ve 1990lı yılların 
başlangıcındaki bağımsızlık hareketlerinin sonucunda yerel devletlerin jeostratejik 
önemi yeniden arttı. Bunlara ek olarak, yeni petrol ve gaz kaynaklarının bulunması 
ile bölgenin Batı için ve özellikle Amerika Birleşik Devletleri için olan cekiciliği 
daha açık bir hal aldı. Buradaki ekonomik gelişme ve güvensizlik sahası bir birine 
sıkı sıkıya bağlıydı ve bölgenin uluslararası kaderi büyük çapta Amerika Birleşik 
Devletleri’nin politikası tarafından belirleniyordu. 
Bu arka plan dikkate alındığında bu tez çalışmasının hedefi, Amerika 
Birleşik Devletleri’nin bu bölgedeki politikasının esas yönleri araştırmak ve bu 
politikasının başarılı ve başarısız yanları ortaya koymaktır. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War led to a 
unipolar world where the United States has remained the only pole. The global 
changes within the international system surely contributed to the shifts in the 
regional balance in the post-Soviet space. Also, all these changes made it 
possible for the only remaining global superpower to project its power in the 
remote post-Soviet regions. The South Caucasus being one of those regions 
became eventually one of the most geopolitically attractive areas for the US 
policymakers. The study includes four chapters, which represent four main 
phases of the US engagement in the South Caucasus. 
 
The first chapter of the study analyses the first steps of the United States 
in the South Caucasus. This phase was unique due to the quite new international 
climate that began to emerge in the region after the end of the Cold War, and 
new geographical, economic, cultural and geopolitical realities it brought to the 
South Caucasus. At the time the United States failed to define important interests 
in the region and limited its engagement with general declaratory rhetoric and 
international organizations’ framework. Having chosen to be involved in some 
other significant regions like Central and Eastern Europe and four former Soviet 
nuclear states, the United States actually gave away the South Caucasus to 
Russia’s disposal. It was the main contradiction of Washington's policy at the 
time to treat the Russian Federation as the stabilizing (mostly peacekeeping and 
not only peacekeeping) force in the South Caucasus. The problem rooted also in 
the misunderstanding the regional conflicts' nature on the part of the United 
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States. The general trend of the policy was to place the burden of the filling 
power vacuum on the shoulders of other regional powers like Turkey and Russia.  
The United States seemed initially to treat the conflicts as religious rather 
than territorial and ethnic ones. This erroneous evaluation as well as far from 
perfect inner structure of the US legislature led eventually to the adoption of the 
notorious Section 907 to the Freedom Support Act, which blocked any US 
government-to-government assistance for Azerbaijan and hence underlined 
hierarchical approach of the United States toward one of the regional actors.   
The United States' leadership also feared the increasing influence of Iran 
and tended even to overestimate the power projection possibilities of this actor in 
the region. Such perceptions, however, determined to a large extent the direction 
of the US policy and made the United States to choose Russia as the lesser of two 
evils.  
All in all, the US policy in the early 1990s included many drawbacks and 
contradictory moves. In addition, it was passive rather than active in the sense 
that the policy was more declaratory and lacked practical steps. Washington was 
inclined to rely more on other actors as well as international frameworks to 
pursue its interests. These interests were not long-term in nature and were 
confined mostly to supporting in declarative terms the independence of the 
Transcaucasian states and limiting its direct involvement with humanitarian 
assistance. 
 
The period of time covered by the second chapter begins with the year 
1994. That was the turning point for the United States policy in the region. Many 
important changes were influenced by oil. The new funds in the Azerbaijani 
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sector of the Caspian Sea and the high stakes of the American companies in the 
"Contract of the Century" contributed to the increased attention of the US 
policymakers to the region. New US energy policy changed the previously 
passive attitude of the whole US policy toward the south Caucasus. Energy 
issues also influenced appearance of some priorities for the United States on the 
state level: for instance, earlier pro-Armenian stance of Washington became 
more balanced now. During that phase of the US engagement Russia's de facto 
defeat in Chechnya also contributed to the changed priorities in the region and 
created the opportunities for the more active American policy. Washington began 
to cooperate militarily with the Transcaucasian states through NATO and the 
appeared link between security and energy became the most important factors for 
the US policy then. Also, during this period the United States began to rethink 
the idea of relying on the regional powers and consequently more active direct 
US policy came to the agenda of the 1994-96. 
 
As for the third and fourth chapters, the level of the United States’ 
involvement in the South Caucasus is shown as the “strategic engagement,” 
which means the United States could afford acting not only within the 
multilateral frameworks, but also unilaterally and the main fear of Russia was 
already left behind at the time. Although the United States remained the only big 
power that theoretically still could quit the game in the South Caucasus, its active 
Caspian energy policy and security semi-alliances with the regional states made 
its engagement irreversible. Irreversibility means that the United States became 
involved too deeply in the region to simply quit. A very complex picture of the 
geostrategic game in the South Caucasus appeared during the second half of the 
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1990s. GUUAM, PfP activities, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project, East-West 
Transport and Energy Corridor, US troops in Georgia - all this speaks for the fact 
that the United States actually became the regional power without being one in 
geographical terms. The event "9/11" only increased the geostrategic importance 
of the South Caucasus for the United States as the gateway to Afghanistan. More 
money came to the region, Section 907 was repealed and the US general 
influence and authority there became overwhelming. This time, the support for 
the independence of the local states and tight cooperation with them in all 
spheres, including military one, have not been declaratory but included concrete 
measures. 
I conclude my study by overviewing the issues examined within the four 
chapters of the work, summing up the key elements of the US policy in the 
region and elaborating on the policy recommendations for the future policy in 
question. 
 
The sources used during the research process include books, periodicals, 
Internet materials, interviews, local TV channels and radio stations (mostly in 
Azerbaijan and Turkey).  
The primary sources (books, periodicals and internet materials) are cited 
in the “Bibliography” section. In this regard, some sources can be singled out due 
to their paramount importance for the current research: “The Grand Chessboard” 
of Z. Brzezinski, “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central 
Asia” of Stephen Blank, Roy Allison’s and Lena Johnson’s “Central Asian 
Security: The New International Context,” and Svante Cornell’s “Small Nations 
and Great Powers.”  
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Interviews were used as a secondary source including those with Rustam 
F. Mamedov, Social-Political Dept. in the Office of the President of the 
Azerbaijan Republic, and Grigol Mgaloblishvili, First Secretary of the Embassy 
of Georgia in Turkey. The information received during the interviews mentioned 
was not, however, used directly in the main text but helped to work out the 
general understanding of the study’s subject. 
 
The study being mostly descriptive in nature nevertheless attempts to 
explain the motives of some US activities in the region. The methodology used in 
the paper can be confined to the issue-based historical approach. The latter 
means analysis of the different paradigms of the US policy in the region 
(military, economic, humanitarian, etc) within the certain period of time. Overall, 
the work covers the period from 1991 to 2002. 
 
 
Figure 1.The Transcaucasian Republics 
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CHAPTER I: 
THE EARLY ENGAGEMENT OF THE US IN THE REGION 
(1990-1993) 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The region of South Caucasus1 comprises three states, which gained their 
independence after the USSR’s dissolution – Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan.  
There are several factors that influence the situation in the region and 
contribute heavily to the region’s instability. As Alexander Rondeli put it: 
The Caucasus is a region, which has little or no tradition of modern 
statehood. It is inhabited by a mosaic of various religious and 
ethnic groups who, for the most part, share a history or legacy of 
friendship, understanding, and tolerance, but have been known to 
display mistrust, animosity, dispute, and violence at other times.2 
 
Taking all this into account, one shouldn’t, however, forget about mighty 
outside influences. Great powers, either global or regional, are the ones that 
determine to a great extent the developments in the region through their active or 
even passive policies. One such power is the sole remaining superpower, the 
United States and its role in the region’s fate will be discussed in the present 
work.  
The Southern Caucasus has always been a part of a broader US policy 
towards the post-Soviet space and, hence, is often cited along with Central Asia 
or the Caspian basin as applied to the area of a single US policy. So, it would be 
                                                 
1 The term “Caucasus” here is and will be mentioned to imply the geographical frontiers of the 
Transcaucasus. 
2 Alexander Rondeli, “Security Threats in the Caucasus,” Perceptions, June-August 1998, p.45. 
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false to elaborate on the American priorities in the region without taking into 
account Central Asia. In addition, the outside players like Iran, Russia, Turkey, 
and China attracted also great attention of the US policymakers. But, on the other 
hand, the region has its own peculiarities, which let determine specific approach 
on the part of Washington. Moreover, the US policy here can’t be viewed as 
equal towards every Southern Caucasian state. Every state of the region attracts 
different sort of Washington’s attention. The early 1990s were the clearest 
indicator of such a policy. If Washington was treating Armenia then mostly 
through the prism of the powerful Armenian lobby in the US, then for Georgia 
the key was to reward Shevardnadze for his role in ending the Cold War and the 
reunification of Germany.3 As for Azerbaijan, initially Washington has had no 
idea as for what kind of policy should have been applied to this country except 
for “punishing” it for the “blockade” against Armenia, but later developments 
raised importance of Azerbaijan’s oil and gas for the United States’ economic 
and geopolitical objectives. 
The United States had no history of significant involvement in the region 
before the demise of the USSR and the region was not so much important for the 
US bilateral relationships with the Soviet Union, Turkey or Iran both before and 
during the Cold War. 
Since 1989, the changes in politics, society, and economics in the 
Caucasus entered the phase of near anarchy, which lasted from 1989 to 1993 and 
was defined by extreme political instability throughout the region, with Armenia 
being an exception here. Ethnic warfare and frequent coups characterized the 
period. As Dimitri K. Simes put it, “…the collapse of empire almost overnight 
                                                 
3 See Josef Presel’s statement (abstract), Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, The 
Caucasus and the Caspian 1996 Seminar Series, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University, 1996, p.85.  
 8 
turned what used to be domestic politics and economics into international 
relations.”4 
At the time of their independence, the Soviet republics were quasi-states 
due to lack of sovereignty traditions: economies of the states were not run 
properly because of states being ill equipped for that purpose. The point is that 
until independence the states’ economies were managed mostly from Moscow. 
So, the ready-made government structures were not actually ready to face the 
new geopolitical and economic challenges.    The process of state building in the 
South Caucasus was also substantially weakened because of the Soviet era’s 
legacy: the deep ethnic divisions inside Georgia and Azerbaijan.  
The West in general and the United States in particular has had limited 
involvement there during the early 1990s. The main foreign geopolitical actor in 
the region has been Russia, and Russia’s policy consisted of attempting to 
promote and take advantage of instability in the region, which entailed 
determined resistance on the part of the local states.5 As Zbigniew Brzezinski put 
it,  
Finally, within the Soviet Union itself, the fifty percent of the 
population that was non-Russian eventually also rejected 
Moscow’s domination. The gradual political awakening of the 
non-Russians meant that the…Georgians, Armenians, and Azeris 
began to view Soviet power as a form of alien imperial domination 
by a people to whom they didn’t feel culturally inferior.6 
 
When it became clear that the Soviet Union was doomed to break-up but 
before the dissolution of the superpower occurred, the United States 
                                                 
4 Dimitri K. Simes, Foreign Affairs, “America and the post-Soviet Republics,” Summer 1992, 
vol.71, no.3 p.74. 
5 See Ghia Nodia, "Forces of Stability and Instability in Transcaucasia," Contemporary Caucasus 
Newsletter, The Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, Issue 3, Summer 1997, p.13  
(http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/caucasus/publications.html). 
6 Z. Brzezinski, "The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives," 
New York, Basic Books, 1998, p.9. 
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paradoxically didn’t intend to contribute to it. The main preoccupation of 
Washington that tried during the Cold War to eliminate the Soviet threat, was 
now to delay or even avoid the dissolution of the Soviet Union. One single threat 
was logically preferred to many unstable spots that threatened to appear on the 
political map. 7 
An example of such an approach can be found in the words of an 
Armenian Armed Forces C-in-C Norat Ter-Grigor’ants who stated, “[US 
Secretary of State James] Baker asked us to help prevent the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, but I explained to him that this was a natural process, and that 
America should not resist this natural process.”8 The US backed Gorbachev in 
his attempts to create a voluntary union of the Soviet republics. In his speech in 
Kiev as late as 1 August 1991 President George Bush tried to lessen with his 
words the independence mood in Ukraine and other republics by saying that 
“freedom is not the same as independence” and by praising Gorbachev’s 
achievements, those like the conclusion of a new Union Treaty. President Bush 
made it clear that the US preference was a democratic, voluntary union of Soviet 
republics.                        
Even when the three Baltic states had declared independence by 21 
August 19919, President Bush held back from recognition until 2 September 
1991. At that day Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would recognize 
                                                 
7 “At the beginning of perestroika, the Soviet Union’s leading Americanist Georgi Arbatov, 
predicted that Mikhail Gorbachev was going to do something far more threatening for the United 
States that any of his predecessors had done: he was going to take away its enemy,” See Paul 
Goble, “Ten Issues in Search of a Policy: America’s Failed Approach to the Post-Soviet States,” 
Current History, October 1993, vol.92, No.576, p.308. 
8 Phillip Peterson, “Security Policy in Post-Soviet Transcaucasia,” European Security, Vol.3, 
No.1, Spring 1994, p.52. 
9 The United States never accepted the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union in 
1940. 
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the independence of all 15 republics and the United States became only the thirty 
seventh state to extend recognition.  
The main priorities for Washington at the time were friendly nuclear 
Russia, non-nuclear Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine and more or less political 
stability in the post-Soviet space.  
 
 
1.2 POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT 
 
1.2.1 Recognition  
 
Between 1990 and 1991 the US Administration didn’t risk backing the 
independence calls on the part of the Transcaucasian states and especially 
Azerbaijan (along with other Muslem Central Asian countries), which was 
simply seen as a Muslem barbarian country.10 Bush Administration did not 
support the demands for Azerbaijan’s independence and backed Gorbachev 
repressing Popular Front activists on January 20, 1990.11 Former Secretary of 
State, James Baker, warned of the dangers of failing to build democracy as the 
Soviet republics split away from the center. "A fall toward fascism or anarchy in 
the former Soviet Union will pull the West down, too", he said.12  
                                                 
10 As Edmund Herzig put it, “Russian and Western sympathies for the Armenian course in the 
early months of the Karabagh conflict…were at least partly conditioned by the perception  of 
Armenians as Christian victims of Muslim fanatics.” (See Edmund Herzig, “The New Caucasus: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia,” London-New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1999, p.87). 
11 About 150 people are claimed to have been killed at that day by the Soviet troops - the brutal 
initial intervention of the Soviet military against Azerbaijani civilian populations in the name of 
restoring Moscow's central control, destroyed any existing faith in the Soviet leadership and 
contributed further to the evolution of spontaneous nationalistic fervor into calls for secession 
12 See Doyle McManus, "Washington says it does not back Azerbaijani call for independence." 
Los Angeles Times. January 18, 1990. 
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Here are some examples below of how the White House officials treated 
the recognition issue. For White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, the 
Azerbaijani demands, "[had] gone beyond the parameters of an ethnic conflict to 
become a political conflict directed against Moscow."13 Furthermore, according 
to Margareth Tutwiler, State Department spokeswoman at the time, the clear-cut 
rationale for not supporting Baku's demands was that "the Administration saw a 
clear distinction between the Baltic republics, who were trying to win their 
independence through negotiations within the Soviet constitution, and the 
Azerbaijanis, who were basically rioting."14  The dual character of the US policy 
could be seen on the example of the US not mentioning Armenia in this regard, 
although the latter also called for international recognition of its independence at 
the time.  
The US recognized Armenia in December 1991, and Azerbaijan only in 
February 1992. Official version of such a partisan treatment of the regional states 
was based on the fact that Yerevan had joined the Helsinki principles earlier than 
Baku did. However, the real reason seemed to be the widespread perception 
(created by the Armenian lobby) of Azerbaijan and the false assumption that the 
latter tried to deprive Karabağ Armenians of their right for self-determination. 
As for Armenia, the Bush administration was eager to praise country’s 
allegedly determined moves toward economic privatization and democratic 
procedures. The first Armenian foreign minister Raffi Hovannisian, the US 
citizen established unsurprisingly good relations with Secretary of State James 
                                                 
13 Manuel Mindreau, “US Foreign Policy Toward the Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan,” 
December 7, 1994, INS 635 US Foreign Policy Analysis, Dr. Alexander McIntire, p.9, 
(http://www.docentes.up.edu.pe/Mmindreau/docs/US%20Foreign%20Policy%20-
%20Armenia%20and%20Azerbaijan.PDF). 
14 See Doyle McManus, "Washington says it does not back Azerbaijani call for independence." 
Los Angeles Times. January 18, 1990. 
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Baker, and Bush received Armenian President and Foreign Minister in the White 
House in November 1991.  A month later, on December 25, Armenia was the 
only Transcaucasian state that was included in Bush's official recognition of five 
of the former Soviet republics. 
Having established diplomatic relations with Armenia and other five 
(Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan (along with Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine) former 
Soviet republics, Washington made the recognition conditional for other two 
South Caucasian republics. Azerbaijan and Georgia should have given 
assurances that they would adhere to responsible policies in the spheres of 
security, democratization, and human rights. Of course, both Azerbaijan and 
Georgia made such assurances but recognition was accelerated by other factors.  
As for Azerbaijan, a series of Armenian offensives in Mountainous Karabağ 
conflict reversed the policy of the White House. Washington realized now that its 
non-recognition policy toward Azerbaijan was only encouraging Armenia to 
continue pursuing its hard stance on the conflict. So, the United States 
recognized Azerbaijan and opened its embassy in Baku on 15 March.15 In 
Georgia’s case recognition was delayed till March 1992 in response to its civil 
war and political turmoil and was influenced mostly by Shevardnadze’s return to 
power as the President of the independent Georgia. 
These delays created the impression of a two-, if not three-tier, hierarchy 
of states in US policy and this made the US policy look negative rather than 
positive in the post-Soviet states that were included in the second and third tier. 
Despite the fact that the US was the first Western government that set up 
                                                 
15 See Hiro, Dilip, "Between Marx and Muhammad: the Changing Face of Central Asia," New 
York, HarperPerennial, 1995, p.95. 
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embassies in all fifteen of the former Soviet republics, the recognition of the 
Transcaucasian states by Washington was lukewarm rather than enthusiastic. 
There’s an opinion16 that Washington’s reluctance to recognize the 
independence of the Muslim countries of Caucasus (Azerbaijan) and Central 
Asia was due to the assumption that these Muslim states must undoubtedly – due 
to their Muslim population – fall into sphere of influence of one of the Muslim 
regional powers, either Turkey and Iran. At least such was the logic of the White 
House that evolved into the main fear that these states could be embraced in the 
end by Islamic Iran and not by secular Turkey.   
 
 
1.2.2 James Baker’s Visit and Fear of Islamic Bloc  
 
What attracted some of the Washington’s attention to the region by the 
time was its (the region’s) closeness to Russia, but also that to two major 
waterways – Black Sea and Persian Gulf. Thus, the impact the region might have 
on Middle Eastern politics was considered to be significant for Washington’s 
geopoliticians. In this regard, the US-Iranian relations were considered to be also 
of high priority in the region.  
One of the most significant consequences of the USSR’s collapse was the 
increased US ability to pursue punitive policies toward some countries because 
of the elimination of the Soviet counterweight. This can be seen from the 
hardened US policy toward Iran since 1992. The sharp measures against Iran 
                                                 
16 Paul Goble, “Ten Issues in Search of a Policy: America’s Failed Approach to the Post-Soviet 
States,” Current History, October 1993, vol.92, no.576, p.307. 
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were taken by the US in 1987 when the trade boycott was declared, and then the 
ban on weapons sales to Iran followed suit in 1992. 
So, by 1992 the US policy toward Iran became stricter and from that time 
one of Washington’s worries in regard to the emergence of the newly 
independent states (NIS) in the region became clearly the fear of the possible 
establishment of an Islamic bloc under leadership of Tehran. So, “Turkish 
model” was chosen by the United States as a counterbalance to the “Iranian-
Islamic model” and further exclusion of Iran out of the region. The idea of Iran’s 
containment in the South Caucasus through Turkey was announced by the US 
State Secretary James Baker who visited the region in January 1992 - even 
earlier than any Russian Foreign minister did.17  
Besides the anti-Iranian stance, Baker’s visit underlined firm support for 
independence (from Russia ad Iran in the first place) as well as for the 
development of liberal democratic regimes in the local states. Also, Baker 
supported the interests of the US private circles as regards the export of the 
Caspian energy resources through the region without crossing Russian or Iranian 
territory. 
Mr. Baker recalled the political importance of this trip noting the 
establishment of embassies in these newly formed independent states as a sign of 
U.S support for their independence and statehood. As the US Secretary of State 
himself stated, "We believe it is important that reform towards democracy and 
free markets take place and it is also important that the United States makes it 
                                                 
17 Actually, this fact does say not in favor of the more active US policy but rather in favor of 
passive Russian policy in the region. 
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clear that it supports the territorial integrity of these countries and the 
independence of these states."18 
As a matter of fact during this trip to the region Baker announced for the 
first time some parameters of US policy toward Transcaucasus. The response to 
this sort of policy on the part of the local states showed how much it meant even 
the United States’ position for Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. In this regard, 
the US overt anti-Iranian policy in the region made the local states think twice 
before approaching Iran. Example of a balanced and very careful relations with 
Iran on the part of the local states are the Mountainous Karabağ mediation efforts 
on the part of Iran which reached its peak in May 1992. At the time Ter-
Petrosyan and Yagub Mamedov met in Tehran and the tri-partite negotiations 
resulted in agreement signed on 8 May, which was about how to settle the 
conflict. What is important in this regard is that both Armenia and Azerbaijan 
included the involvement of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) and the US President George Bush.19 
The US position was related not only to the local states, but also to the 
outside players like Turkey and Iran. Washington made radical decision in favor 
of Ankara as a preferred post-Soviet surrogate for the United States. However, 
Turkey’s chances to play the role Washington wanted it to play were limited to 
some extent. Turkey’s limitations as a positive agent in South Caucasus included 
lack of resources, complex relations with Armenians and internal security 
considerations. Pushing Turkey to pursue very active policy in the region, 
Washington wasn’t able to stand clearly on Turkish side against Russian 
                                                 
18 See, “The State of Affairs in the Transcaucasus: An Interview with The Honorable Former 
Secretary of State James Baker,” by Jayhun Mollazade, Caspian Crossoroads, vol. 1, no. 2, 
Spring 1995. (http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/128.htm). 
19 The agreement’s fate was decided by the fall of the Azerbaijani city Shusha. 
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reintegration attempts in the South Caucasus. Besides, the US refused to assist 
Turkey even financially in its “Turkish belt” grand design. In February 1992, 
Turkish Premier Demirel visited George Bush and provided him with a 13-point 
program on Central Asia, which would be sponsored, according to Demirel, by 
the US due to the financial weaknesses of Turkey. But, as it turned out to be, 
Washington was also not ready to finance the program due to the burgeoning 
federal deficit.20 As Paul Goble put it, 
Expecting that the US would finance its attempts to influence 
Central Asia, Turkey in 1992 promised aid to the region equal to 
80 per cent of its hard currency reserves. The US, however, has not 
come through with the required financing, Turkey has had to 
renege, and as a result it had its influence decline.21 
 
The result of James Baker portraying Caucasus and Central Asia as a 
battleground between Turkey and Iran22 and betting on Turkey was the emerging 
alliance between Russia and Iran. Overall, though the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union was a positive factor for US foreign policy in most areas of the world, in 
the case of Iran this was not the case. US support for the newly independent 
states of the Caucasus and Central Asia has drawn Russia and Iran closer 
together to challenge what they considered US hegemonic ambitions. 
The region was turning into the battleground with emerging alliances 
instead of becoming an area of inter-state cooperation and stability. 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 After Dilip Hiro, op cit., p.70. 
21 See Paul A.Goble, “The 50 Million Muslim Misunderstanding: The West and Central Asia 
Today,”p.3, in Anoushiravan Ehteshami ed., “From the Gulf to Central Asia: Players in the New 
Great Game,” University of Exeter Press, 1994. 
22 Typical of the US thinking of Iran is the article of Charles Krauthammer, who wrote in January 
1993: “Iran is the center of the world’s new Comintern…As with Soviet communism, this new 
messianic creed must be contained.” (See the Sunday Record, 3 January 1993.) 
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1.2.3 Relying on Russia as the Stabilizing Force 
 
America tried to pursue a policy which aimed to stabilize the region as a 
whole and each local state without challenging Russia’s initial hegemony there, 
which was logical because of Moscow’s leading role within the Soviet Union. 
Also, Washington refused to take any serious commitments as regards the local 
states and the whole picture of the US policy toward the Transcaucasus was 
pursued mostly in the framework of the US-Russian relations. In addition, “By 
mid-1993…it appeared that neither Turkey nor Iran was set to supplant residual 
Russian influence in Central Asia. Political authority in the newly independent 
“states” has been retained, in most cases, by members of the old communist elite, 
who retain links with Moscow.”23 When the CIS (Commonwealth of 
Independent States) Supreme Commander, Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov 
warned on 20 May 1992,24 that foreign military intervention in the Karabağ issue 
could lead the world into “the Third World War,”25 Washington cautioned 
Turkey not to intervene, while the Russian authorities warned Yerevan not to 
attack Nakhichevan.26  
In February 1993, Yeltsin issued his demand to the United States and the 
international community about accepting Russia’s sacred rights to use military 
force and be the sole peacemaker in the post-Soviet space. The silence and 
ambiguity on the part of the US at the time let Russia think that Washington in 
                                                 
23 Rosemarie Hollis, “Western Security Strategy in South West Asia,” in Anoushiravan 
Ehteshami op cit., p.192. 
24 Five days after the CIS Collective Defense Treaty signed among others by Armenia, was 
promulgated. 
25 See Turkish Daily News, 21 May 1992. 
26 See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 and 23 May 1993. 
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principle had nothing against this idea. The point is that the US interests in the 
region initially were neither direct nor rooted in the regional states themselves, 
but in Russia and the prospects of democratic reforms there. At the time the main 
preoccupation of Washington in the region was connected to curbing instability. 
If the Bush Administration considered Russia to be too busy with its 
domestic problems to be seriously engaged in the South Caucasus, then the 
Clinton Administration “…has generally viewed a democratizing Russia as able 
to play a stabilizing role in the Transcaucasus, though stressing that Russia 
should not seek to dominate regional economics and politics or otherwise 
exclude Western and other involvement.”27  
As for the regional states, in the wake of their independence Georgia and 
Azerbaijan immediately sought the withdrawal of Russian troops from their 
territories, although both states did intend to retain the material part of the 
military forces. Russia pulled out of Azerbaijan in May 1992 but stayed in 
Georgia. So, Azerbaijan became the first former republic of the Soviet Union, 
which got rid of Russian troops and military bases-even before Germany.28 As 
for Armenia, the new military force was created, which inherited the arms from 
the former Soviet units. Moreover, some units were taken over by Russia and 
stayed on the Armenia’s territory with the consent of the Armenian 
government.29   
                                                 
27 Jim Nichol, “Transcaucasus Newly Independent States: Political Developments and 
Implications for US Interests,” CRS Issue Brief, 95024, December 20, 1996. 
(http://www.fas.org/man/crs/95-024.htm). 
28 However, the lack of highly qualified officer corps in Azerbaijan (due to the Moscow’s policy 
pursued before the USSR’s dissolution and aimed at the taking Moslems away from the Soviet 
officer corps) the Soviet armory left in Azerbaijan proved to be useless in the war against 
Armenia. 
29 See John W.R. Lepingwell,  “New States and Old Soldiers: Civil-Military Relations in the 
Former Soviet Union,” in John W. Blaney, (ed.), “The Successor States to the USSR,” 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington D.C., 1999, p. 60. 
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The contradictory element in the US policy was seeing Russia as the main 
peacekeeping force in the South Caucasus, albeit under the mandate of 
multilateral organizations. Washington seemed to be satisfied with Russia taking 
over the responsibility for the region. So, the premise was that Russia could 
really be a stabilizing force in the region The false assumption was made that 
Russia was preoccupied with its own problems and had no time for filling the 
power vacuum emerged in the South Caucasus. The contradiction here was, on 
the one hand, seeing Russia as the stabilizing force in the region and, on the 
other, thinking of these peacekeeping activities as something benign for the local 
states.  
Only in mid-1993 did it emerge that Washington was developing 
new concerns about the implications of this stance for the future 
independence of the Central Asian and Transcaucasian states…The 
reason behind the rethink in Washington was the extent of Russian 
disregard for the norms of peacekeeping operations developed by 
multilateral organizations such as the United Nations (UN).30  
 
All the hopes faded away when the Russian foreign Minister Andrei 
Kozyrev who was viewed as one of the most liberal Russian officials, stated in 
the U.N. General Assembly session in the fall of 1993 that the Caucasian states, 
the Baltic states and the Balkans have constituted important interests for Russia 
for 200 years and the latter didn’t intend to abandon those interests. 
Summing up, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Washington had 
sought to export the "Turkish model" to block the possible expansion of Iranian 
influence. But it soon became clear that Russian power would not be turned back 
so quickly, especially as Ankara seemed incapable of offering any solution to the 
problems of the newly independent republics. 
                                                 
30 Rosemarie Hollis, “Western Security Strategy in South West Asia,” in Anoushiravan 
Ehteshami op cit., p.193. 
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1.3 THE US POLICY TOWARD THE REGIONAL CONFLICTS 
 
While the US policymakers were mostly preoccupied with the 
developments in the Eastern Europe, the Russian military was left seeking new 
missions. Having formally recognized the independence and territorial integrity 
of the new states, Russia was doing everything to promote separatism in the 
region while trying to divide and rule the local states. 
       In exchange for Russian support, Shevardnadze was forced to join the 
CIS in October 1993. An interesting example of Russia’s dictating Georgia’s 
policies at the time can be seen on the following example. When Shevardnadze 
attempted to read a press release announcing Georgia’s membership in the CIS, 
“…Russian diplomats took it out of his hands and gave him a Moscow-authored 
text to read. Such was the degree of independence enjoyed by Shevardnadze at 
the hands of his Russian patrons.”31 
 The region seems to present a very complicated picture due to several 
ethnic conflicts that have taken place there before and after the dissolution of the 
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). None of the conflicts though 
“frozen”, can pretend to be resolved quickly or even approaching any sort of 
solution. Deadlock is worsened by the fact that the region is the arena of 
international players’ collisions and Turkey, Russia, Iran and the United States 
are drawn to a different extent into the game. The “Soviet legacy” left after the 
empire’s break-up is nothing but the territorial structure imposed by Moscow on 
                                                 
31 “The New "Great Game": Oil Politics In the Caucasus and Central Asia by Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. 
(Backgrounder #1065, January 25, 1996 
(http://www.heritage.org/library/keyissues/russia/caucasus.html). 
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the ethnically diversified region. Out of nine minorities living in the South 
Caucasus (Mountainous Karabağ Armenians, Talysh and Lezgins in Azerbaijan; 
Ossetians, Abkhaz, Ajars, Azeris and Armenians in Georgia; and Azeris in 
Armenia) four enjoyed autonomy - Mountainous Karabağ Armenians in 
Azerbaijan, Ossetians, Abkhaz and Ajars in Georgia. 32 
In all cases a national minority’s percentage was different: in 
Mountainous Karabağ the population of Armenians was about 120,000 – 80% of 
the region’s population – in South Ossetia there were 67,000 Ossetians – 66% of 
the region’s population, and in Abkhazia there were 100,000 Abkhaz  - only 17% 
of Abkhazia’s population. Looking at these figures one can surely understand 
that without outside backing these minority groups could do little to outplay the 
central government’s forces and establish themselves as the de facto independent 
entities. As Thomas Goltz noted:  
No colonial power, from Darius to de Gaulle, has ever voluntarily 
and peacefully relinquished its previous sphere of influence…and 
the Russian policy appear to be based on the tacit threat of 
dismemberment of those states that wish to leave Moscow’s 
orbit…by promoting the concept of self-determination of local 
minorities at the expense of the territorial integrity of existing 
states. 33 
 
Through this policy the regional conflicts – in Mountainous Karabağ, 
Ossetia and Abkhazia (that is, on the territories of Georgia and Azerbaijan) – 
have emerged on the agenda of the early 1990s. Armenia has always been (and 
this state of affairs became even more actual after the majority of Armenia’s 
                                                 
32 Ethnic composition of the South Caucasus: More than 300,000 Azeris live in Georgia, 200,000 
Azeris inhabited Armenia before the conflict, 150,000 Azeris live in Daghestan, about 500,000 
Armenians live in Georgia, about 20,000 Georgians, 40,000 Kurds, 200,000 Lezghins, live in 
Azerbaijan, 450,000 Russians and 50,000 Jews inhabited Azerbaijan by the mid-1990s. (after 
G.Reza Sabri-Tabrizi, “Azerbaijan and Armenian Conflict and Coexistence,” in Anoushiravan 
Ehteshami ed., op cit.,p.163). 
33 See “Thomas Goltz, “Letter from Eurasia: The Hidden Hand,” Foreign Policy, No.92, Autumn 
1993, p.92. 
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Azeris and Kurds left the country for the purposes of providing safety for 
themselves) one of the homogeneous countries of the former Soviet Union and, 
thus, it was less vulnerable to the manipulated separatism than were Azerbaijan 
and Georgia. 
Despite many differences between the conflicts, all of them have some 
similar characteristics. They are territorial and ethnic disputes in nature. And it 
was one of the main misunderstandings on the part of the West, including the 
United States, to treat the conflicts as religious ones. In case of Mountainous 
Karabağ, there’s a struggle between Muslim Azeris and Christian Armenians. 
But there was no sign of radical Islamic fundamentalism in Azerbaijan because 
Azerbaijan was a fully secular state. On the other hand, Islamic Shiite Iran34 has 
in many occasions supported Christian Armenia. As for the Georgian conflicts, 
both Georgians and Ossetians are Orthodox Christians and majority of 
Abkhazians are also Christians.  
However, from the international legal viewpoint Washington had chosen 
right position as regards the allegedly legal conflict between self-determination 
principle and territorial integrity principle. In 1992, the US Ambassador-at-large 
Max Kapelman was cited as saying that self-determination principle (which was 
used by separatist forces) “is a limited human right encompassing cultural 
independence, freedom of religion, language and association” but that  “…it does 
not include the right to change boundaries at will.” 35 This position Washington 
has been supporting till today. 
The Georgian national movement of the end of the 1980s counted on 
establishing strong relations with Western countries, including the United States. 
                                                 
34 Azerbaijan’s population is mostly Shiite Muslims as well. 
35 Sergo A. Mikoyan, “Russia, the US and Regional Conflict in Eurasia,” Survival, 40 (3) 
Autumn 1998, p.119. 
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However, the Western governments preferred to back Gorbachev's attempts to 
democratize Soviet federalism than to support Georgian independence. After the 
demise of the USSR, Western governments even refused to recognize the 
independence of Georgia and to establish normal diplomatic relations with the 
government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia because of ethnic conflicts and political 
turmoil in Georgia. The return of the former communist leader, Eduard 
Shevardnadze, was supported by both Russia and the West. Shevardnadze's 
popularity above all in Germany and the United States raised hopes among the 
Georgians that the country would acquire a greater independence from Russia.36  
According to J. Aves, out of the three Transcaucasian states, Georgia 
adopted the most radical stance in asserting its independence from Moscow.37 
Because of this, Georgia was "punished" and Moscow not only gave way to the 
ethnic conflicts in Georgia's territory, but also backed the separatist movements 
in two Georgian autonomous provinces Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This led to 
the de facto disintegration of the fragile Georgian state. 
Georgia’s reluctance to join the CIS structures was overcome by the 
Kremlin through inciting the riots in Abkhazia in 1992. Russia backed politically 
and militarily the Abkhazian minority. Being unable to suppress the rebellion 
Georgia had to join CIS and ask Moscow’s help against advancing 
Gamsakhurdia’s troops. The result was not only Georgia’s membership in the 
                                                 
36 James Baker about Eduard: “But obviously you cannot think about that country without 
thinking about Eduard Shevardnadze.  I am not sure that the Cold War could have ended 
peacefully without him.  He changed all our lives.  And when we thought about that part of the 
world we never forgot it.  The man's a hero.”  
(http://www.michaelspecter.com/ny/2000/2000_12_18_tbilisi.html) 
37 Aves, Jonathan, "The Caucasus States: the Regional Security Complex," in “Security 
Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia,” ed. Roy Allison and Christoph Bluth (London: The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs. 1998) p.176. 
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CIS but also 15,000 Russian troops on its territory as well as a Russian 
peacemaking force in Abkhazia. 
Russian support for Abkhaz secessionists, the resounding Georgian 
military defeat in Abkhazia, the de facto secession of Ossetia and the Western 
lack of intervention led in October 1993 to a radical revision of the Georgian 
foreign policy concept. Georgia was forced to agree with the dominance of 
Russia in the area.  
 
 
1.3.1 South Ossetia Conflict   
 
Several of Georgia's ethnic minorities began their separatist actions, in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s and the South Ossetians were the ones who called 
in late 1989 for joining their territory with North Ossetia in Russia or for 
independence. Repressive measures were carried out by the then Georgian 
President Zviad Gamsakhurdia and massive conflict began in late 1990. The war 
lasted 18 months till June 1992 when the Russian-brokered cease-fire was 
reached. It was Yeltsin who brokered a cease-fire, and a predominantly Russian 
force of about 500 troops was stationed in South Ossetia.38 The enclave has 
practiced a large degree of self-rule and relied heavily on Russia in financial 
terms. 
The first thing that forced Washington to pay some attention to the 
conflict were the television pictures of the Georgian repression of the Ossetian 
rebellion in 1990, the year when the autonomous Oblast declared 
                                                 
38 A Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPF) deployed in South Ossetia consists primarily of Russian 
troops along with a smaller Georgian and Ossetian component. 
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independence.39 The US position on the nature of the conflict was the same as in 
the Mountainous Karabağ issue – predominance of territorial integrity over self-
determination or, to put it simpler, separatism. 
The role of Washington in the conflict was confined mostly to the 
humanitarian assistance. At the time the White House preferred to rely upon 
extensive bilateral assistance programs that aimed at improving administration 
and governance under the Tbilisi regime, allocating funding to international 
nongovernmental organizations such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross to help address social problems. In addition, the United States supported 
the efforts of multilateral intergovernmental institutions such as the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe.40 
 
 
1.3.2 Abkhazia Conflict 
 
In Abkhazia the conflict’s escalation reached far higher level. On July 23, 
1992, the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet declared its effective independence from 
Georgia and this prompted Georgian national guardsmen to attack Abkhazia.  
Abkhazian conflict began in August 1992 and when it was over, about 
15,000 people were dead and 200,000 were left homeless. According to Irakli 
Batiashvili, former chief of the Georgian intelligence service, the Abkhazians 
were backed militarily by Russians, who supplied them with weapons under the 
                                                 
39 Which wasn’t recognized by international community as in the case of Mountainous Karabağ 
and Abkhazia. 
40 See Robert Cutler, “Tskhinvali (South Ossetia), Georgia,” Nov. 2001,  
(http://www.selfdetermine.org/conflicts/ossetia.html). 
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guise of humanitarian items.41 So, Georgia was looking for the West’s support 
and the hopes of many Georgians were associated with the United States as the 
most influential power in the world. The hopes increased after Shevardnadze, 
whose popularity in the West was enormous, was elected the Georgian President. 
However, as one of the influential Georgian politicians noted in 1994, “We had 
the naïve belief that the West would resist the imperial politics of Russia and 
offer tangible support to the new independent states. But the West is primarily 
interested in Russia. That is why it shuts eyes to everything else. We didn’t take 
it into account and now find ourselves at the edge of a catastrophe.”42 
In October 1992, the U.N. Security Council approved the first U.N. 
observer mission to a NIS state, termed UNOMIG (United Nations Observer 
Mission In Georgia), to help reach a settlement. The UN first deployed a very 
small, unarmed observer mission in Abkhazia in mid-1993 to verify the 
implementation of the first cease-fire of 27 July 1993. In mid-September 1993, a 
cease-fire was broken by Abkhaz separatists and, after intense fighting, the 
Russian and North Caucasian "volunteer" troops that reportedly made up the bulk 
of Abkhaz forces routed Georgian forces by the end of the month. Their autumn 
1993 offensive resulted in the capture of Sukhumi and pushed Georgian forces 
and civilians east of the Inguri River into Georgia. Up to 250,000 Georgians and 
others fled Abkhazia, creating a refuge and humanitarian crisis.  
In terms of a diplomatic settlement to the Abkhazia conflict, the United 
States has relied, like in Ossetia case, upon multilateral institutions. It has 
supported efforts by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to 
monitor the situation and the offices of the UN Secretary-General to resolve it. 
                                                 
41 See Besik Urigashvili, “Damn This War,” The Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists, 
January/February 1994, p.22. 
42 See Besik Urigashvili, op cit., p.22. 
 27 
The US had also become a member of the FOG grouping (Friends of the UN 
Secretary-General for Georgia) to promote movement toward a settlement.”43  
This grouping consisted of the United States, Germany, France 
(coordinator), the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation (facilitator) and 
its main task has been “the creation of the document on distribution of 
constitutional competencies between Sukhumi and Tbilisi, with full respect to the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia.”44 However, the final consensus 
amongst the Group members was yet to be achieved. 
Washington wasn’t as active in the Georgian conflicts as in Mountainous 
Karabağ. The US was “present” there only through the channels of multinational 
organizations like the CSCE and the UN and through participating in the 
UNOMIG. As in the Mountainous Karabağ issue, from the beginning of the 
ethnic conflicts in Georgia, the US State Department took the position of being in 
accordance with the main principles of international law. 
 
 
1.3.3 Mountainous Karabağ Conflict  
 
Mountainous Karabağ conflict has the largest international implications 
out of all the regional conflicts due to the fact that the warring parties are two 
independent states. In addition, the outside players’ involvement – the US policy 
including – has always been much deeper than that in other conflicts. The 
conflict between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis broke out in 1988. However, 
                                                 
43 See Robert Cutler, “Georgia/Abkhazia,” October 2001,  
(http://www.selfdetermine.org/conflicts/abkhaz.html). 
44 http://www.mfa.gov.ge/intorg.html 
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the full-scale war as such erupted in 1992, with the Armenians demanding 
complete independence for Karabağ or its absorption into Armenia. 
Since 1988, the conflict in Mountainous Karabağ has resulted in 
thousands of casualties and hundreds of thousands of refugees on both sides. 
Approximately 20% of Azerbaijan, including Mountainous Karabağ, was 
occupied by Armenian forces during the fighting and entailed more than 
1,000,000 refugees, mostly Azerbaijanis. Various CIS and other states have 
attempted to mediate the conflict, including those of Russia, Kazakhstan, and 
Iran, and the United Nations and CSCE, all with limited success. Here, the peace 
process since 1992 was embraced by the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, Britain, France, and the United States (within the CSCE 
Minsk Group, which was established to mediate the conflict in question) and this 
organization has overshadowed CIS efforts to achieve a resolution of the conflict. 
For example, in mid-1991 a Helsinki Commission visited Armenia, and an 
agreement brokered by President Yeltsin was signed on September 23, 1991. 
However, despite this “achievement” new fighting broke out in the subsequent 
months and the level of violence even increased. 
In the early 1990s the engagement in the peace initiatives on the 
Mountainous Karabağ issue on the part of Washington was minimal and focused 
mostly on taking part in the multilateral efforts to resolve the conflict. 
Secretary of State James Baker used to express the American 
government's concern to find a solution within the framework of the CSCE45 
probably in the hope of preventing unilateral action by Russia, or Iranian 
involvement in the region. It is worth mentioning that the Interim Report of the 
                                                 
45 See Le Monde, 14 February 1992. 
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CSCE Rapporteur Mission on the situation in Mountainous Karabağ contains the 
positions of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Turkey as if they were the 
only external players, without any reference to Iran.46 
The abovementioned Minsk Group - composed of Russia, Belarus, the 
United States, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Switzerland and Czechoslovakia - 
received a mandate from the CSCE Council of Ministers on 24 March 1992. The 
first fact-finding team arrived in Mountainous Karabağ in March 1992, after an 
Armenian offensive. The former US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, was chosen 
as Head of Mission because of his achievements in the former Yugoslavia.47 His 
mission in Transcaucasia also included support for the CSCE mediatory efforts 
led by Jiri Dienstbier.  
Similar mediators’ missions followed suit in May and October 1992 but 
no positive results were achieved. The resolutions of the UN Security Council 
and those of the CSCE expressed the need to end fighting, clear occupied 
territories, restore territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and resolve the dispute 
through peaceful means, i.e. negotiations. 
No radical steps were taken partly because the US didn’t intend to send 
military forces into the remote and volatile region. The only more or less radical 
move was made under the auspices of the Bush Administration in 1992 when 
“territorial swap” proposal was discussed. This proposal showed the extent to 
which the United States was unfamiliar to the true nature of the conflict.  
According to this plan, Armenia would give away Zangezur while 
receiving in return Mountainous Karabağ and the corridor that would link 
                                                 
46 “Contested Borders in the Caucasus”, by Bruno Coppieters (ed.),VUB University Press, 
Chapter IV, 1996, (http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/ContBorders/eng/contents.htm) . 
47 A short time before this Cyrus Vance persuaded the warring factions in Croatia to respect a 
cease-fire and to accept a UN peacekeeping operation. 
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Armenia with it. The warring parties surely rejected the plan due to the 
importance that both Azerbaijan and Armenia paid to land, and, namely, 
Mountainous Karabağ.  
Azerbaijan didn’t intend to cease its sovereignty over the territory that 
has been Azerbaijanian since ancient times and was populated by Armenians 
only in the 19th century. From the Armenia’s perspective the plan deprived it of 
very important link to Iran and Persian Gulf while making it possible for Turkey, 
to get direct rail links to Baku. 
While Elchibey was willing to agree to CSCE mediation and cease-fire 
accord with Armenia, the next Azerbaijani government headed by Heydar Aliyev 
at the time seemed not to “…favor the appointment of the United States as 
mediator because of its "dangerous" ties with Armenia.”48 Such vision of the 
United States could be well understood in the light of the discriminatory Section 
907 to the Freedom Support Act, which was depriving the country of the US 
humanitarian aid at the time when about 1 million refugees were starving. Along 
with the US Congress the American media was also biased at the time and 
favored the Armenian side using the terminology "return" or "reunification" of 
Karabağ to Armenia. Many stories appeared between 1988 and 1991 referred to 
Karabağ as "locked inside Azerbaijan since 1923."49 Furthermore, Western 
journalists named the parties as "Christian Armenians and Muslim Azerbaijanis", 
though the conflict, as it was already mentioned above, wasn’t religious.50 
Little by little, Washington’s view on the nature of the conflict began to 
change. In 1993 the US position towards Armenia became a bit more severe as 
                                                 
48 Manuel Mindreau, op cit., p.12. 
49 See Meghreblian, Diran. "Armenia's Cold Struggle." The International Herald Tribune. March 
24, 1993. 
50 See "Armenian Unrest in the Caucasus", The Economist, March 5, 1988. 
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the Armenians’ offensives continued and intensified. Washington rejected at last 
the Armenians’ claim that Yerevan wasn’t engaged in the fighting and the 
official Yerevan was named by the State Department as the warring party. 
The United States’ lack of political will to be engaged more actively in 
the mediation of the conflict could be explained by the general approach of 
Washington to the region, where it did not see its direct interests. Moreover, at 
the time the United States was overloaded with other international hot issues 
waiting for its involvement so that Mountainous Karabağ along with South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia just had to wait.51 
 
 
1.4: MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN ENGAGEMENT 
 
1.4.1 Military Engagement 
 
Speaking of the vision of Caucasus by the US Department of Defense it is 
necessary to underline that in the early 1990s the Central Asia and the Caucasus 
constituted only the Area of Interest and not the Area of Responsibility (as the 
Gulf did, for example) of the US Central Command, CENTCOM. If the US 
interests in the Gulf were considered by the CENTCOM as positive ones then 
those in South Caucasus as negative interests and entail less than containment of 
instability.52 
                                                 
51 "This comes when most Americans believe the time has finally arrived to dedicate more 
attention and resources to problems at home rather than being the world's major benefactor and 
promoter of international security." In Brief. United States Institute of Peace, September 1992. 
52 Rosemarie Hollis, “Western Security Strategy in South West Asia,” in Anoushiravan 
Ehteshami ed., op cit., p.188. 
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By 1993 an important document of the US foreign policy had emerged, 
the so-called “Clinton Doctrine,” which was complemented in summer 1993 with 
the “Bottom Up Review” called so by its author, the Pentagon new Defense 
Secretary Les Aspin. It would be useful to analyze both documents because of 
the influence they made on the region. 
“Clinton Doctrine” contained two very different positions of the US on 
the international affairs: the US intention, on the one hand, to exercise leadership 
in the world. As Warren Christopher put it: “We must lead in every respect. 
When we’re protecting our own vital interests, we’ll lead unilaterally if we need 
to.”53 And on the other hand, the United States preferred as practice showed, to 
use multilateral framework on many issues, especially on humanitarian ones. 
Another important element of the new doctrine was the direct and 
mutually reinforced link between domestic and foreign politics, which required 
sustaining the US economic strength both at home and abroad through promoting 
American trade. According to old tradition, the flag always followed trade.54 
Two conflicting paradigms of the new doctrine – leadership and 
multilateralism – meant above all selective approach of the US to every issue in 
the international system depending on the importance of the issue for the 
American national interests. 
According to Aspin’s document there were four main threats for the USA 
after the elimination of the single threat – the USSR: 
i. nuclear proliferation 
ii. failure of democratization efforts in the post-Soviet space  
                                                 
53 See Warren Christopher interview on the PBS MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour, transcribed in USIS 
European Wireless File, no. 102/93, 3 June 1993, p.7 
54 There were also other components of the doctrine like containment of weapons proliferation, 
promotion of democracy and human rights to aid stability, environmental issues, combating drag 
trafficking and terrorism. 
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iii. regional, ethnic and religious conflicts, which may threaten “American 
vital interests, American friends, American allies, and the American sense 
of decency.”55 
iv. failure to understand the importance of the US economic strength at home 
for its security.56 
 
The first two points, constituting primary significance for the US 
policymakers at the time, need some clarification. As for the nuclear-connected 
stuff inherited by the Transcaucasian states,57 it included Armenia’s nuclear 
power reactors in the Metsamor nuclear power plant, nuclear research center, 
spent fuel and radioactive waste, Azerbaijan’s many radioactive waste sites, 
Georgia’s highly enriched uranium at the Mtskheta site, research reactor and the 
isotope-production reactor in Sukhumi, Abkhazia.58 The nuclear non-
proliferation policy on the part of Washington might have been rational and 
successful as applied to the so-called four nuclear states of the former Soviet 
Union. However, as regards the South Caucasus there were some 
misconceptions.  
The first one was that the US considered the non-proliferation policies in 
the region as isolated from the security needs of each country as well as those of 
the region as a whole. Also, the CTR programs were designed only for the 
                                                 
55 See Les Aspin’s May 16 Commencement Address at Beloit College, Wisconsin, transcribed in 
USIS European Wireless File, No.92/93, 18 May, 1993, p.8. 
56 Rosemarie Hollis, “Western Security Strategy in South West Asia,” in Anoushiravan 
Ehteshami ed., op cit., pp.189-190. 
57 See Cassady Craft, “Reconciling disparate Views on Caucasus Security: Non-proliferation at a 
vital crossroads,” p. 231, in Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus 
and Central Asia,” ed. By Gary K. Bertsch, Cassady Craft, Scott A. Jones, and Michael Beck, 
Routledge, New York London, 2000. 
58 Located in Abkhazia, the institute previously housed 2 kilograms of enriched uranium in 1992 
and has been impossible to inspect due to the unresolved conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia 
( See Chrystia Freeland, “Scientists Warn of More Nuclear Perils,” Financial Times, April 23, 
1998, p. 4). 
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“nuclear four” and the other newly independent states were thus considered by 
Washington to be not so important. The US policymakers didn’t take into 
account the fact that after becoming independent states the Transcaucasian 
governments inherited very little of the Soviet MPC&A (Material Protection, 
Control and Accounting) infrastructure and no export control systems at all.59  
According to this view, the burden of non-proliferation efforts in the 
South Caucasus was given to Russia, which masterminded two main instruments 
to treat the issue - the Minsk Accord on non-proliferation export control 
development of 1992 and the CIS, i.e. Russian border troops. As for the Minsk 
Accord, the United States found the states’ corresponding commitments to non-
proliferation control development for international security purposes as 
sufficient. However, the states’ capabilities to fulfill their commitments were not 
enough and the states saw little interest in doing this. Azerbaijan and Georgia 
were engaged in the conflicts on their territory and their only dream was to 
restore the sovereignty on the territories in question. Armenia’s acceptance of the 
development of the MPC&A infrastructure for the Metsamor rooted in the need 
for energy, and because of the link that existed between such development and 
the US humanitarian assistance. As for the Russian border troops, they were just 
a semblance of border control because of their inadequacy in treating non-
proliferation issues not only in Georgia and Armenia, but also in many cases in 
Russia itself. Azerbaijan has never accepted Russian border troops. All in all, the 
United States still needed to understand the importance of the region for its non-
proliferation policies. Also, the latter wasn’t perceived by the Transcaucasian 
                                                 
59 See Cassady Craft, “Reconciling Disparate Views on Caucasus Security: Non-proliferation at a 
Vital Crossroads,” op cit., p. 231. 
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states in the early 1990s as a very significant issue and was much more important 
(though not perceived as such) for Washington. 
The link between failures of democratization efforts in the post-Soviet 
space and the Department of Defense was the role of the new post-Soviet 
military establishments in the Caucasian republics. The latter ones were viewed 
as obstacles to the strengthening democratization and independence of the local 
states. In the years 1991-1992, much of military hardware and manpower was 
transferred more or less intact from the disintegrating Soviet command structure 
to the emerging command structure of the new states. As Elizabeth Sherwood-
Randall put it, 
Our information both about these transfers, and about the internal 
politics of these “new” national militaries, remained extremely 
limited. The United States was interested in facilitating the 
eventual reform of these military structures in ways that would 
buttress rather than undermine emerging democratic systems, as 
well as ensure greater regional peace and stability. We tried to 
develop and strengthen bilateral, multilateral, and regional security 
alliances towards this end.60   
 
In the military sphere the greatest progress was made with Georgia but 
the presence of the Russian military bases and “peacemakers” within Georgia 
made it impossible for Shevardnadze to begin reform in the military sector at the 
time.61 Also, the State Department has decided to back a besieged President 
Shevardnadze and provided him with a US-trained security guard.  
On the whole, more progress has been made again on the multilateral 
front and the United Nations’ and CSCE’s multilateral frameworks were the 
most significant ones: The United Nations has been intermittently important in 
                                                 
60 Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Contemporary Caucasus Newsletter The Berkeley Program in 
Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, Issue 5, Spring 1998, “US Policy and the Caucasus,” p.3.  
(http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/caucasus/publications.html). 
61 “Besides diplomatic efforts and humanitarian and development aid (described below) that 
support peace and independence, some US media have reported US security training for 
Shevardnadze's presidential guard.” See Jim Nichol, op cit. 
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mediating the Abkhazian conflict, and 150 UN officials were engaged in the 
area, keeping an eye on the “CIS” peacekeeping force. Georgia has requested 
more of this attention, but the UN and United States was unable to authorize this 
on financial grounds.  
The CSCE has attempted to deal with the Karabağ conflict. A chicken 
and egg situation existed here because of the absence of an OSCE peacekeeping 
force, despite the willingness of the Pentagon to help with this plan and send 
American troops to the region at the time. The absence of the peace agreement 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan makes the implementation of the plan 
impossible. 
There was also another multilateral framework connected to military 
issues in the south Caucasus and namely, the CFE (Conventional Forces in 
Europe) Treaty.62 The 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty established a 
ceiling for equipment levels,63 but in fact has been more important as an element 
in local states’ negotiations with Russia, which has been keen to “trade-off” 
military assistance and equipment for a share of the Caucasian countries’ CFE 
quotas. Both Armenia and Georgia have entered such agreements. Azerbaijan, 
however, continued its independent course and declined entering any sort of 
agreement of the kind.64 The reaction of support from Washington was very 
important not only for Azerbaijan, but also for the whole system of regional 
security established and guaranteed by the CFE Treaty. During 1993 discussions 
                                                 
62 While the CFE Treaty stipulated a ceiling on the quantity of military equipment that the blocs 
could maintain, it did not specify national limits for individual states. That is, limits were 
assigned to two groups of states, but not, for example, to Russia or Germany. The blocs were then 
further divided into zones constructed mostly around Central Europe. One zone, “the Flank 
Zone” included Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, and the Caucasus, along with some states and areas 
in North Europe. See R Bhatty and R Bronson, “NATO's mixed signals in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia,” Survival, Autumn 2000. (Vol. 42 No. 3), p.233. 
63 The Soviet Union’s quotas were divided among the post-Soviet states at the end of 1991 
64 See S. Cherniavskii, “US Strategy in the Caucasus,” International Affairs (Moscow), vol.45, 
no.2, 1999, pp.54-55. 
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within the CFE Joint Consultative Group in Vienna it was Armenia (along with 
Belarus and Ukraine) that supported Russia’s request about suspending 
implementation of the Article V of the Treaty concerning the flank limits and 
Clinton appeared to be one of the most sympathetically oriented North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization’s (NATO) leaders. As Frederick Starr put it, “The United 
States has gone so far as to insist that there is no linkage between Russian efforts 
to destabilize the Caucasus region and the revision of the conventional forces in 
Europe Treaty, even though a treaty revision could legitimize Russian forces 
being used for this purpose.”65  
Toward the end of World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt made it 
clear to Prime minister Winston Churchill that Washington would do nothing to 
encourage the continuation of the British Empire’s existence. In contrast, 
Presidents Bush and Clinton seemed to agree to an extension of Russian empire 
in the early 1990s. At least their steps and lack of activity in this direction 
pointed to this. If Russia is to take over the old Soviet Empire, Europe will be as 
divided as it was in the Cold War years. In the fist year of its term the Clinton 
Administration has given priority mostly to domestic economy rather than to 
foreign policy issues. As for the latter ones, Clinton seemed to placate Russia at 
the expense of other regions like South Caucasus. In early November Warren 
Christopher told NATO leaders that Europe was no longer priority for the United 
States and the former Warsaw states were given little attention taking into 
account even Bosnia’s fate being abandoned by Washington at the time. Overall, 
the US position here seemed to concentrate on the Central Europe at the expense 
                                                 
65 See Frederick Starr, “Power Failure: American Policy in the Caspian,” The National Interest, 
no. 47, Spring 1997, p.27. 
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of the Transcaucasus and by 1993 the US de facto accepted Russia's military 
dominance in the region.66 
 
 
1.4.2 US Oil Companies’ Early Involvement 
 
  It would be useful for the present research to understand the past of the 
United States policy in the Middle East in order to make conclusion about the US 
general policies as well as the US private companies’ oil interests in the 
Caspian,67 which had become a part of the so-called “Greater Middle East” after 
the demise of the USSR. In case of the Gulf it were the oil companies that 
introduced the first major element of the US in the region and the US 
Government recognized the strategic value of the region’s oil resources only 
after the World War II. The penetration of the US in the Middle East began in 
1939 when the US oil companies got the half-ownership of a concession in 
Kuwait and exclusive concession in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. As access to oil 
became significant to Washington, it began protecting its interests, without, 
however, being active enough and relying mostly on the Great Britain. After the 
fall of Shah in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the US 
perceived the necessity of introducing its military component, and namely, rapid 
intervention capabilities to preserve its interests in the region. These measures 
were not complemented by the creation of a sort of regional security institution. 
The similarity between the US involvement in the Gulf and in the post-Cold War 
                                                 
66 Even if Washington and other Western governments never formally accepted the Russian 
concept of a “Near Abroad.” 
67 Speaking of the oil reserves in the Caspian Sea one must be clear about the fact that those are 
estimated to be at least larger than the oil reserves of the North Sea. 
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Caucasus is that in the latter case the US also didn’t recognize its oil interests at 
the Government’s level.68        
The private American oil companies began negotiations with Azerbaijan 
communist government in1990. As the American journalist who spent the early 
1990s in Baku, noted, in 1991, “…the representative offices of such giants as 
AMOCO and Pennzoil were single rooms in the old Intourist Hotel. From there, 
they tried to make contact and talk about oil with the bureaucratic machine of the 
old Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic.”69 The only deal that almost got signed 
during the period of Mutalibov’s government was that with the US MEGA Oil 
Company. But this was not the actual oil contract but sooner a trade-off under 
which, oil contracts “…were to be exchanged for Praetorian Guard-style security 
services – that is, money for muscle to protect the Mutalibov regime from the 
opposition Popular Front.”70 The first real oil contract was concluded under 
Elchibey’s government in October 1992 when Azerbaijan closed a $2.420 billion 
deal with the United States-based Pennzoil Company for development of the 
Guneshli offshore oilfields in the Caspian Sea, and no quote was provided for 
Russia in the contract.71 American oil companies were not backed by the parallel 
actions of the official Washington but, nevertheless, they had some say in the 
regional politics. This could be seen on the example of the government’s change 
in Azerbaijan. When the Popular Front Party headed by Elchibey was left in 
minority in the Azerbaijani Parliament, and Elchibey was forced to flee Baku, the 
new Western oil consortium of British Petroleum (BP), Amoco and Pennzoil 
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69 Goltz, Thomas, “Catch-907 in the Caucasus,” The National Interest, No.48, Summer 1997, 
pp.39-40. 
70 ibid. 
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gave $70 million in “good faith” to new-born Aliyev’s government while the 
United States (as well as the EU and Turkey) initially supported Elchibey.72  
At first, however, Aliyev was reluctant to carry out radical anti-Russian 
policy in the way Elchibey did it and thus at the end of June 1993, he suspended 
a deal between Azerbaijan and a consortium of eight leading Western firms 
(including BP, Amoco and Pennzoil) to develop three Azerbaijani oil deposits.73 
The later developments showed that it was just a maneuver, which could be 
explained by the difficult position Azerbaijan was at the time in and by the 
necessity to balance between main big powers so that Azerbaijan could defend its 
true independence. After that was achieved Aliyev welcomed Western oil 
companies and American ones received even more than they expected – about 
40% in the “Contract of the Century.”74 All in all, the oil interests of the US were 
evolving slowly because there was no realization at the time of the coincidence 
of the US Government’s and oil companies’ interests in the region. 
 
 
1.4.3 Humanitarıan Assistance 
 
The United States was the first Western government that legislated and 
implemented funding support for transition processes of the former Soviet 
republics. Promotion of democracy and market principles have been carried out 
by Washington through US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
programs under the Freedom Support Act (FSA), which was enacted as early as 
                                                 
72 Paul Wiberg-Jorgensen,  “America’s Freedom to Act in the Caspian Area” European Security, 
Issue 8.4, 1999, pp.231-232. 
73 “Contested Borders in the Caucasus”, by Bruno Coppieters (ed.),op cit. 
74 More detailed analysis on the subject is given in the next chapter. 
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1992. USAID concentrated on humanitarian aid and only later began to pay high 
attention to economic and democratic problems.75 The United States became 
automatically the largest bilateral aid donor by far to Armenia and Georgia. Most 
US aid to the Transcaucasus addressed urgent needs for food, shelter, medicine, 
and energy. US aid to Armenia also focused on ameliorating the impact of the 
blockades, and included food and heating oil aid, health care aid, programs in 
energy conservation, and research on oil, gas, and coal potential. American 
humanitarian assistance and credits for grain were of big importance for Georgia 
in the early 1990s, helping the population to avoid the mass hunger. In the early 
1990s Armenia was provided with $262 million worth aid package that included 
fuel.76 The latter was very important for Armenia due to the permanent gas 
stoppages from Georgia.77 
As for Azerbaijan, the latter was refused any sort of government-to-
government humanitarian assistance from the US according to the Section 907 to 
the Freedom Support Act, which will be analyzed below in a detailed way due to 
its importance for the regional politics and the US policy there. 
Besides notorious Section 907, another important misgiving in the US 
approach toward the region was its premise that if the US provides during the 
period of transition the local states with much humanitarian assistance, these 
states make an easy transition to democracy and liberal market economy. The 
premise was false, however, because the states in question had no tradition of 
democracy except for the short period of time in 1918-1921. In addition, the 
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Soviet culture was still strong enough in those states to let democracy take root 
from the beginning of transformation occurred. 
Another very important point is that the most part of it was sent to Russia 
showing again the unbalanced approach to other former USSR republics. 76% of 
the humanitarian assistance to the former Soviet Union was being given to the 
Russian Federation in the early 1990s.78 
 
 
1.4.4 Section 907 and Powerful Armenian Lobby 
 
Under the strong influence of the Armenian lobby the US Congress 
passed in October 199279 the Freedom Support Act which contained the Section 
907 that forbade direct US government-to-government assistance to Azerbaijan 
until the latter’s blockade of Armenia is lifted and until Azerbaijan ceases all 
aggressive actions and “improves its human rights record.”80 The Section 
presented the partisan US policy in the region and the clear support for one of the 
warring parties in the Mountainous Karabağ conflict. Being the major donor to 
refugee programs in the area, the United States at the same time deprived 
approximately 1 million Azerbaijani refugees of the humanitarian aid. 
Although the initiative for imposing economic sanctions had been 
proposed while communist leader Mutalibov was still in power in 1991, the 
                                                 
78 See Paul Goble, “Ten Issues in Search of a Policy: America’s Failed Approach to the Post-
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Section 907 was passed by the US Congress after Elchibey was democratically 
elected as President in 1992.”81 
The fact that this Section could be passed despite the US State 
Department’s resistance can be explained by several factors: 
 
i. Lack of information about the true state of affairs. The question should be 
asked as follows: who was using force against whom when Congress passed the 
notorious Section? With 20,000 dead, about one million refugees and some 20% 
of its territory occupied Azerbaijan was never able to impose blockade on 
Armenia. Baku imposed embargo because of being actually at war with Armenia. 
It would be strange for two warring parties to trade with one another. 
ii. Lack of realization of American interests in the region at the time. The 
volatile and remote region and Muslim Azerbaijan were not perceived to be 
important for Washington at the time and when the time has come for the Bush 
Administration to intervene and maybe veto the passage of the Section the Bush 
Administration while opposing the inclusion of the article in the Freedom 
Support Act was not so brave to endanger the whole Act by vetoing one Section, 
especially in an election year.82 
iii.    Strong Armenian lobby in the United States. The Armenian National 
Committee of America, for example, possess significant political power in the 
US and control the most important electorate states like New Jersey, New York, 
California, and Illinois, which comprise nearly half of the total electoral votes 
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needed to be elected the President of the United States. 83 The appointment of the 
US citizen Raffi Hovanissian as the first Foreign Minister of Armenia also 
showed the strong links between Armenian American lobby and the politics in 
Armenia and whole region. Neither the State Department nor the Congress 
seemed to pay attention to political changes in Azerbaijan, its attempts to reform 
or its participation in CSCE peace efforts at the time. This entailed some 
disappointment with the US in Azerbaijan because after the Popular Front came 
to power in Azerbaijan in June 1992, President Elchibey made it clear that 
Azerbaijan would prioritize relations with the United States and NATO member 
countries.  In addition, the fact that Baku began active anti-Iranian policy 
accusing the Iranian regime with human rights violations, could serve as a proof 
of Azerbaijan’s readiness to become the US main ally in the region.84 The 
perverted nature of the Section should be regarded not only in terms of foreign 
politics in the region but also in the light of the effect it had on the domestic 
politics in Azerbaijan. Thomas Goltz sheds light on the issue arguing that 
“Rather than promoting institutional change in Azerbaijan…the Congress 
has…dedicated itself to the business of changing the government in Baku.”85 The 
condition of giving assistance to Azerbaijan was that the aid would not be carried 
out in government-to-government framework.86 The point is that any 
organizations or persons who were allowed to receive US assistance were not 
simply non-governmental entities but opposition that had the profound interest to 
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replace the current government rather than to build the civil and democratic 
society. So, by giving aid to opposition the US de facto had revolutionary rather 
than evolutionary character 
 
 
1.5 MAIN GUIDELINES AND WEAKNESSES OF THE US POLICY 
 
The United States and the international organizations controlled by the 
US have begun making first steps toward the Newly Independent States in the 
region since 1991. The steps, however, were made mostly in declaratory terms. 
The absence of practical steps was connected with Russia. The US policymakers 
tended to look at the Caucasus from Russia’s perspective and were preoccupied 
with placating Russia first when developing policy toward the region. That is the 
reason why the US policy toward the post-Soviet space in the early 1990s is 
coined as “Russia-first” policy and that is why Paul Goble characterized the 
American early policy toward the post-Soviet states as “Russia plus branch 
offices.”87 As a result of such a lazy approach the US didn’t have a specific 
policy on the Caucasus in the early 1990s. Also, the region was still viewed from 
Washington through the Cold War paradigm and even the staff workers of the 
White House, which were responsible for the formulation of the policy toward 
the region, worked in the departments previously charged with working out 
relations with the USSR.  
So, it was no surprise that their attention was focused on Russia. The 
other reason, why at that time the United States did not have a coherent Caucasus 
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policy, is because most policymakers and researchers were unfamiliar to the 
region. Besides Russia-first policy the United States was giving priorities to other 
regions like Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic states (because of traditional 
support, even during the Cold War, of the Baltic states’ independence from 
Russia), Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus (because of the nuclear stuff situated 
on the territories of those states and the necessity to collect all of this stuff in 
Russia). As Sherwood-Randall put it, “…preoccupation with the four “nuclear 
successor states” (Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus) prevented the 
Caucasus and Central Asian states from getting much serious attention until 
1994”88 
 
 
1.5.1 Main Guidelines of the US Policy 
 
In the wake of the Soviet collapse in 1991, the United States developed 
working guidelines for dealing with the Soviet successor states. These included 
recognition of the states as independent and viable entities, support for their 
transition to market economies and democratic societies, facilitation of their 
integration into international institutions, and encouragement of regional 
cooperative arrangements. 
However, while initially supporting independence of the new states, the 
US saw the nationalist movements as nearly the obstacles to the stability and 
cooperative developments in the region. Therefore, Washington intended initially 
to prevent them from breaking fully away from Russia’s environment. This was a 
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paradoxical position taking into account the long-term struggle with the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War, when all the efforts of the US were aiming to make 
the Soviet threat disappear. As Frederick Starr put it, 
America’s initial responses to the emergence of the fifteen 
successor states was to support integrative policies, whether in the 
form of the Commonwealth of Independent States, an extensive 
ruble zone, or the transnational programs of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Having conceived economic development 
as an alternative to nationalism and not a product of it, United 
States policy attempted to work around nationalist sentiment rather 
than through it or with it.89  
 
But this policy can surely be understood in terms of the disappearance of 
the Soviet threat as such by the early 1990s and emergence of the new threats in 
the form of 15 post-Soviet republics and the conflicts on their territories, which 
threatened to spill-over into broader conflicts with bigger powers drawn.  
Overall, the US policy after the USSR’s dissolution was shy and was not 
active here due to acknowledging the region as Russia’s sphere of influence and 
because of still respecting Russia’s position as the successor of the Soviet 
Union’s superpower paradigm. While surely supporting Turkey in its role as a 
new regional leader in the early 1990s, Washington still feared Russian radical 
response and thus at the same time preferred Russia controlling events in the 
volatile region. Of course, Washington understood the danger of possible 
confrontation between Russia and Turkey in the light of Shaposhnikov’s words 
about “third World War” and Ankara’s close military links to Elchibey’s 
government Washington showed much respect to Russia’s military (nuclear and 
conventional) capabilities at the time and treated Russia as almost equal to the 
USSR in this sense. 
                                                 
89 See Frederick Starr, “United States Policy and National Development in the Post-Soviet 
States,” in John W. Blaney, ed., “The Successor States to the USSR,” Congressional Quarterly 
Inc., Washington D.C., 1999, p.266. 
 48 
All in all, one can conclude that the issues that have really driven US 
policy in the region have less to do with the region itself than with countries 
outside the South Caucasus like Iran, Turkey and Russia. Washington’s policies 
in the early 1990s represented the twist between containment of political Islam, 
influence of Armenian lobby and fear of negatively influencing Russian domestic 
politics.90 The idea that free hand must be given to democratization and 
economic development of Russia, because the positive transformation of Russia 
would give positive impulses to other former Soviet republics including 
Caucasian ones, while democratization’s failure would mean beginning of the 
turmoil in the republics in question. While Turkey was chosen by Washington as 
the channel of influencing Caucasus and Central Asia and Iran as the main 
enemy, the policies of new-born Russia were assumed to be benign in the region 
and the Clinton Administration gave Moscow free hand there. For the first four 
years of the Clinton Administration, Russia was the center of US policy in the 
NIS and US observers were skeptical of the viability of the other states. Policy 
initiatives in the NIS were all adjuncts to the Russia-first policy and to a strategic 
priority to dismantle the Soviet military machine and nuclear arsenal and confine 
it within Russia.”91 
The other characteristic of the early US policies was “…a multilateralist 
cloak for security operations in the area and attempt to use this to contain both 
Russia’s ambitions and the spread of instability.”92 By February 1992, US 
                                                 
90 After Leila Aliyeva ”The Foreign Policy of Azerbaijan,” Central Asian and Caucasian 
Prospects, Briefing Paper no.9, October 1996 (http://www.riia.org/Research/rep/bp9.html). 
91 See Fiona Hill, “A Not-So-Grand Strategy: United States Policy in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia since 1991,” Politique étrangère, February 2001, 
(http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/fhill/2001politique.htm). 
92 Rosemarie Hollis, “Western Security Strategy in South West Asia,” in Anoushiravan 
Ehteshami ed., op cit., p.203. 
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Secretary of State James Baker was already expressing his government's support 
for an active CSCE policy, hoping to prevent unilateral action by Iran or Russia.  
Clinton Administration also preferred the multilateral framework instead 
of intervening directly. As for the international organizations, CSCE attempted to 
take some initiatives in the Caucasus after March 1992 when Georgia’s access to 
the CSCE took place.93  
So, if we consider immediate policy goals of the US in the region, they 
were, “…to buttress the stability and independence of the states through 
multilateral and bilateral conflict resolution efforts and to provide urgent 
humanitarian relief.”94 As a matter of fact Washington failed to develop a clear 
regional concept of the region within the European security system. The interests 
of the US here remained marginal and were subordinated to its relations with 
Turkey and especially Russia. 
 
 
1.5.2 Weaknesses of the US policy 
 
Lack of information. The weaknesses in US's ability to gather and analyse 
information from the former Soviet Union can be seen on the South Caucasus 
example where the US intelligence community, that knew every detail of 
Moscow life was not well prepared to process information on the local republics. 
For instance, until journalists and diplomats went regularly to Baku since early 
1992, little information came to Washington from Azerbaijan. Instead of 
devoting much energy and means to collect and process information on the post-
                                                 
93 Armenia and Azerbaijan had been accepted into the CSCE in January 1992. 
94 Jim Nichol, op cit. 
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Soviet space funding was cut because the Cold War ended.95 The United States’ 
ignorance of the region showed itself in “Some officials…believed that the 
peoples of these former Soviet republics were not really interested in 
independence.”96 The lack of regional processes’ understanding proves the 
assumption on the part of the US officials that the Muslim barbarians “…were 
ripe targets for Islamic fundamentalism that would sweep into region from Iran 
or Afghanistan.” 97Again the US policymakers were not well informed about the 
fact that the post-Soviet governments were secularist and fundamentalism has 
been an insignificant force in the republics. 
Hierarchy of states’ treatment in US policy. Hierarchy on the part of 
Washington appeared in the form of the abovementioned three-tier recognition of 
the former Soviet republics. This impression was reinforced between April and 
October 1992, as the US Congress debated the Freedom Support Act. This 
document was designed to be the legal basis for the US bilateral assistance and 
economic cooperation with the newly independent states but inclusion of the 
Section 907 into the Act underscored the hierarchical approach of the US toward 
Azerbaijan. Moreover, instead of being neutral, the US de facto took sides in the 
Armenian-Azerbaijanian dispute. 
Although the new US government later, by 1993, recognized the 
importance of formulating a coherent policy toward all the states of the former 
USSR, and tried to implement this through appointment of Strobe Talbott as the 
Ambassador-at-Large to the newly independent states in March 1993, the 
Caucasus states were still viewed as second or third class states.  
                                                 
95 Manuel Mindreau, op cit., p.13. 
96 See Frederick Starr, op cit., p.25. 
97 ibid., p.25. 
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Absence of the unified US policy. Lack of unified US policy means that 
the latter was split between different departments of the State Department. In the 
early years after the USSR’s demise responsibility for each NIS state and for 
various issues was parceled out to different US government departments and sub-
departments. For example, the promotion of initiatives related to the democratic 
development of the newly independent states, was split among the US Agency 
for International Development and the State Department. While the center was 
not much interested in the region’s geopolitics, each department pursued its own 
policy in the region.98 
Treating Caucasus and Central Asia as one Entity. Actually, the US 
policymakers’ tendency to view nearly the whole post-Soviet area and later the 
CIS as one single entity only because to Russia’s centrality in the former Soviet 
regions was false and naïve.  
Much more important misunderstanding of the early 1990s was for the 
US policymakers to consider Caucasus and Central Asia always together without 
drawing a strict line between the regions, treating the Caucasus as a part of the 
enormous Greater Middle East region. The regions had too many different 
geopolitical priorities to be treated together. In this regard only the Pentagon 
seemed to have chosen right path by allocating Caucasus and Central Asia areas 
to different departments: Central Asia was assigned to the US Central Command, 
while the Caucasus states fell to the US European Command. 
Confused and ambiguous policy pursued. The US policy for South 
Caucasus appeared to be improvisational and ad hoc at the time. In 1993, for 
example, the US Administration supported deposed Azerbaijani President 
                                                 
98 See Fiona Hill, “A Not-So-Grand Strategy: United States Policy in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia since 1991,” Politique étrangère, February 2001,  
(http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/fhill/2001politique.htm). 
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Elchibey, but US oil companies meanwhile negotiated with the new Aliyev 
government on the subject of $4 billion worth oil contract. In Armenia, the 
United States has called for the withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijani 
territory outside Mountainous Karabağ. However,  
it has done it without enunciating a clear stand on how and why it 
wishes the issue to be resolved, thereby stiffening the resolve to 
resist on the part of Nagorno-Karabakh and its irredentist allies in 
Yerevan, who are seeing their struggle both in terms of Israeli 
history and in the light of Bosnia’s experience.99  
 
One of the reasons for such a confused policy was the inner structure of 
the US State Department. As Rosemarie Hollis put it in 1994,  
Perhaps because the formulators of Western policy on Central Asia 
are also the ones who handle relations with Moscow, they are 
bound to view events in terms of the effects on Russia and its 
power. The result is a mixed bag of gestures to bolster the 
reformers in Russia along with strictures designed to limit Russian 
dominance over its neighbors.100  
 
So, as the examples show, the US policymakers did not always 
comprehend the course they pursued and the US policy in the region, thus, was 
incoherent and sometimes lacked clarity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
99 See Henry R. Huttenbach, “Chaos in Post-Soviet Caucasia, Crossroads of Empires: In Search 
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CHAPTER II: 
"BLACK GOLD" AND WAR IN CHECHNYA AS THE 
CATALYSTS OF THE US INVOLVEMENT (1994-1996) 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
If in the early 1990s the US policy in the region was more ad hoc, then 
since 1994 it began to become more clearly formulated and coordinated. As the 
former Soviet troops were withdrawn from the territory of the Baltic states in 
August 1994, nuclear weapons were removed from Kazakhstan, Belarus and 
Ukraine by 1996 and it became clear that economic transition and political 
reformism in Russia didn't "Go West" at all, the geopolitical basis was ready for 
the United States to change its policy in the former Soviet Union. 
Actually, there were two grand events that altered and determined the US 
policy at this stage: the so-called "Contract of the Century" and the War in 
Chechnya. One of the events was military in nature and the other - economic one. 
In this way both events created two main paradigms - economic and military - 
through which the second stage of the US policy is treated in this chapter.  
Geopolitically, these two events contributed to the main change that 
occurred in the American policymakers' perceptions. They began to pursue more 
balanced policy toward the NIS countries. The best definition of this policy can 
be found in the Z. Brzezinski's article "The Premature Partnership" where the 
author describes what he calls "geopolitical pluralism." Shortly, "geopolitical 
pluralism" is the "multiple access to the region, which will result in prosperity 
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that will benefit all concerned, including immediate neighbors of the region and 
Russia."101 Although this time the US policy had also much to do with Russia,102 
the latter was not placed at the center of the American NIS strategy. Instead, no 
center was there as such.  
When in September 1994 in Washington Yeltsin demanded that the 
United States recognize Russia's special status for carrying out peacekeeping 
functions in the CIS, Clinton's answer was negative. Moreover, the US President 
suggested that Russia should cooperate with the United Nations in this sphere 
and other international organizations. The other sign of the West neglecting 
Russia's peacekeeping role in the "Near Abroad" became evident when the 
OSCE took the decision to send peacekeeping troops to Mountainous Karabağ 
and Russia's unilateral right to intervene was thus denied.  
However, the year when the US policy changed radically was 1996 when 
the Chechens recaptured Grozny and Yeltsin was re-elected. While the first event 
showed weakened conventional military capabilities of Russia, the second one 
meant "…the US no longer needed to support his policies for fear of an anti-
Western reaction in the Russian elections."103 
Concept of the “geopolitical pluralism” in the United States’ policy 
became evident not only within the NIS but also in the South Caucasus. Earlier 
clearly pro-Armenian stance of Washington became now more balanced due to 
the increasing oil interests' and Jewish organizations' pro-Azerbaijan lobbying in 
                                                 
101 "Russia's "Sphere of Influence" - Chechnya and Beyond," by Zbigniew Brzezinski  Azerbaijan 
International, Spring 2000 (8.1) 
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will not seek or be able, politically or militarily, to dominate." See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The 
Premature Partnership," Foreign Affairs, vol.73, no.2, p.79. 
103 Svante Cornell, "Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the 
Caucasus," Curzon Press, 2001, p.375. 
 55 
the US Congress. So, the Americans' treatment of both warring parties became 
more equal at the time. The whole framework of geopolitical pluralism had far-
reaching consequences for the US policy like, for example, the so-called 
"multiple pipelines' doctrine," East-West corridor project, strengthening NATO's 
role in the Southern Tier of Russia, proposing "win-win opportunities" for all 
parties, contributing to the local state development through humanitarian 
assistance, etc. 
It is no surprise that after being changed the US policy in the region 
acquired also new principles to be guided by. All in all, one can single out four 
following major official principles of the US policy at the second stage of its 
engagement in the region: "…reinforcing the independence of the former Soviet 
states of the region, diversifying world oil supplies, promoting US commercial 
interests, and containing Iran."104  "Reinforcing independence" here logically 
included support of stabilization, economic market reform and integration into 
Euro-Atlantic family of nations.105 The United States also pursued nuclear non-
proliferation efforts in the region. However, these initiatives cannot be treated as 
the major principle of American policy in the region. Rather it seems to be the 
major guideline of the US global policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
104 See Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project John F. Kennedy School of Government,  
"The Caucasus and the Caspian" the 1996 Seminar Series of SDIP, p.87. 
105 If not in institutional, then at least in geopolitical terms. 
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2.2 HOUSTON DISCOVERS CAUCASUS FOR WASHINGTON 
 
As Svante Cornell put it, "…the importance of the Caspian and the 
Caucasus was discovered in Houston, not in Washington."106 The newfound 
interest of the US in the South Caucasus owes to the strategic economic resource 
of the global economy - oil. Control over, access to or the diversification of this 
resource can be surely characterized as an important national interest. Oil was the 
rationale to help achieve this objective and multiple pipelines doctrine and this 
strategy was repeatedly outlined as  
strengthening the independence and prosperity of the new Caspian 
states, bolstering regional cooperation, enhancing global energy 
security through the free flow of Caspian oil and gas to world 
markets and increasing investment opportunities for companies 
from the United States and other countries.107  
 
The private American companies were powerful enough to successfully 
lobby their interests in Washington and even make some former American 
policymakers interested in the future of Baku and the Caucasus as a whole.108 
Access to oil and diversification of its supply was proclaimed by the White 
House as the ground for pursuing the active policy in the region. 
 The US policymakers seemed to name oil supply's diversification as the 
national policy objective. This was a strong claim that took into account the fact 
that the United States' imports were more than 40% of its oil supplies and the fact 
that even if the Caspian region109 would not become one of the main source110 of 
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oil supply for the United States, then it would surely become one of the main oil 
sources for the world market.  
This variant is also important in Washington's eyes because of easing 
dependence on the Persian Gulf and, hence, having positive influence on the 
global energy balance by ensuring lower worldwide oil and gas prices for years 
to come. Especially, this problem was even more real for Europe where oil 
production is going to decline from 8,4 million barrels per day to 6,5 million 
barrels per day. 
There are different estimates of the Caspian Sea's reserves. While 
different Western experts calculate proven and unproven reserves as 
correspondingly 27 and 40-50 billion barrels,111 the US Department of State 
released the figure of 90 billion barrels (like Iran's or Kuwait's oil reserves).112 
The US Department of Energy estimated in its report that the potential oil 
reserves in the Caspian Sea basin may compose approximately 200 billion 
barrels. If true, this figure would mean that Caspian Sea equals oil potential of 
Iraq or Saudi Arabia. The point is that some sort of exaggeration was pursued 
consistently by the US Government for the reasons explained below.  
The event that underlined the strategic significance of the South Caucasus 
for the United States was the so-called "Contract of the Century," which was 
signed in September 1994 between SOCAR, State Oil Company of Azerbaijan 
Republic, and the Consortium of major international companies, the Azerbaijan 
                                                                                                                                    
110 "…It was this vital interest that took the United States and the international coalition to war in 
the Persian Gulf to ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil from that region." See Strengthening 
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Sea. 
112 İbid. 
 58 
International Operating Company (AIOC). The aim of the contract was to exploit 
the oil fields offshore in the Azerbaijanian waters of the Caspian Sea.113 In $7,5 
billion American private companies had 44% of the agreement's shares and 
began playing leading role in the oil exploration under the agreement. If we look 
at the issue from the viewpoint of the zero-sum game, we can see the vital 
interest of the US in getting high stakes at the agreement: containment of Iran. 
Hadn't Washington occupied 44% of the share, its place could well be taken by 
Iran. It is not difficult to imagine then the failure for the US Middle East strategy 
with Baku-Gulf pipelines crossing the Iranian territory. 
James MacDougall pointed to the fact that it were not the companies 
themselves but "…the government officials who labored behind the scenes to 
support US interests in the Caspian region."114 The American commercial 
presence wasn't confined, however, only to the oil companies. American 
engineering, energy technology and service companies have been also active 
here. In any oil contracts American companies participated as operators which 
meant they had a say in the contract and so it were them on whom depended the 
"speed" of oil and gas exploration. US companies' role can also be extended to 
the warming in US-Azerbaijani relations, which were pretty cool before due to 
the US Government's initial negative stance toward new post-KGB leader of 
Azerbaijan. So, the private companies did their best to raise Azerbaijan's profile 
in the eyes of the US policymakers and "there was a slight warming in US-Azeri 
relations following a meeting between Vice President Albert Gore and President 
Aliyev in Cairo, Egypt, just prior to the signing the AIOC agreement in 
                                                 
113 AIOC itself was created in 1991 but the political instability in Azerbaijan determined the 
postponement of negotiations till November 1993 when Heydar Aliyev's government gave green 
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114 See James MacDougall, "The New Stage In US-Caspian Sea Basin Relations," Central Asia, 
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September 1994."115 Also, the American companies' presence and activities in 
the region contributed to many opportunities for American jobs, investment and 
exports, and, hence, presented US commercial interests' stakes, which were 
defined above as one of the four major US interests in the South Caucasus.  
As Edmund Herzog wrote,  
The AIOC agreement marked a watershed in several ways: it 
bought international companies into Caspian Sea oil development 
for the first time (thereby igniting the Caspian legal regime 
dispute); it was the first major foreign investment in Azerbaijan (or 
the Caucasus); it focused Western interests much more sharply on 
the Caspian and Azerbaijan.116  
 
One can add to this list the fact that after having signed the Contract, 
Western policymakers (including American ones) began to treat the instability 
and conflicts in the South Caucasus with full attention. Also, the AIOC 
agreement was the event that determined the following history of the region and 
it is no coincidence that after three months after the signing Russia began 
invasion of Chechnya. 
As Paul Goble put it, "A hundred years ago, some analysts suggested that 
the fate of the region would depend on the construction of rail lines; more 
recently, observers have argued that it will depend on pipelines."117 After the 
Contract was signed the logical question arisen on the agenda: how to deliver the 
oil into international markets? It is a good question because Caspian is a land-
locked sea and the Transcaucasian states (except for Georgia) have no access to 
major seaways. Iran, Russia and Georgia are therefore three potential transit 
countries for the outlets. While Iranian route is excluded by the US veto on trade 
                                                 
115 Robert E. Ebel, "Energy choices in the Near Abroad: The Haves and Have-nots Face the 
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with Iran, Russia and Georgia are consequently two only candidates. While 
Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline seemed to be the best route, the US insisted on 
rebuilding the Georgian outlet and even proposed the third one, through Turkey. 
"On no one quality, on no one process, on no one country, on no one route, and 
on no one field must we be dependent. Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety, 
and variety alone,"118 - these words of Sir Winston Churchill about 
diversification of oil supply and national security were evaluated and understood 
properly in the White House. In 1995 Zbigniew Brzezinski delivered the US 
President's letter about the regional pipelines to Heydar Aliyev. Also, in early 
October US President Bill Clinton called Aliyev and, according to a White 
House spokesman, "…expressed his support for commercially viable, early 
constructed, and multiple oil pipelines from the Caspian Sea region that would 
benefit the companies that were investing in oil development as well as all the 
countries of the region."119 After this lobbying on the part of the United States 
the decision was taken by Azerbaijanian President to develop pipeline routes that 
would be laid outside Russia's territory. 
So, on October 9, 1995 the decision on dual pipelines was announced by 
the AIOC. The decision was concerned only with the early oil (approximately 
80,000 barrels a month). The whole notion of early and ultimate oil is best 
explained by means of two concepts proposed by Jack Carter, the then Senior 
Advisor for International Affairs in the US Department of Energy. According to 
him, the Caspian oil development can be divided into two major parts:  
                                                 
118 See Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1991, p. 160. 
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i. Opening gambit - development of early oil production from the initial 
wells that can be delivered to international markets without using larger 
diameter pipelines. The purposes of the early oil is, firstly, to indicate the 
prospects of further oil production and, secondly, to help finance current 
oil exploration activities. 
ii. Endgame - "…struggle over who will control the pipelines for the larger 
flows of oil that will come from the region."120 
 
So, the United States' position about early oil dominated in the end. As a 
matter of fact, Washington adopted the same strategy (multiple pipelines) not 
only for early oil but also for the larger diameter pipelines. The existence of a 
Russian route only would present a great danger, so the US policymakers, to the 
independence and sovereignty of the local states due to many reasons. Firstly, the 
northern route as the only route for oil transportation would allow Moscow to use 
the pipeline for manipulation purposes and unilaterally threaten the oil delivery, 
raise tariffs or somehow limit the oil exports. As a matter of fact, Baku-
Novorossiysk as the only functioning route at the time reflected the old plans of 
the Kremlin that even in the Soviet Union times aimed to make the Soviet 
republics dependent on Moscow and deny them having independent economic 
life.121 Also, Baku-Novorossiysk route was seen as unreliable because it was 
crossing unstable Chechnya. So, the first reason can be summarized as the lack 
of security along the Russian route. Secondly, limiting access to oil by only one 
route would have resulted in much less benefits for all parties. The statistics 
                                                 
120 See Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project John F. Kennedy School of Government,   
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shows that oil revenues of Azerbaijan could comprise over $2 billion per year122 
and Georgia could get over $500 million a year from the transit fees.123 In order 
to achieve this aim, the oil had to find safe, uninterrupted and, thus, multiple 
access to the international markets. 
While Russia was against the multiple pipelines running out of the region 
it tried to prevent Baku-Supsa from becoming reality through the pressure 
rendered on Eduard Shevardnadze. The latter refused to drop the idea and it is of 
no surprise that the unsuccessful assassination attempt on his life took place in 
1995.124 
On the other hand, the US contributed as much as possible to Georgia 
becoming transit country and fully supported Azerbaijani-Georgian cooperation 
on the issue as well as US companies' (Chevron, Bechtel, etc) participation in the 
Baku-Supsa project. Armenia's position in the great oil game of the region was 
very modest due to the Mountainous Karabağ conflict and Azerbaijan's 
determination not to let Armenia benefit from the oil developments. The United 
States' position in this regard was somewhat favoring Armenia's perspectives and 
proposing to share the Caspian oil with Yerevan so that the latter accepts a 
compromise with Baku on Mountainous Karabağ issue. As Jack Carter put it, 
"…There were some suggestions to create a "banana line," if you will - one that 
goes through Georgia, and one that goes through Armenia - so that they can 
answer all regional interests. But again, the difficulty between the parties is a bit 
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of an obstacle there."125 However, all these suggestions were rejected 
consistently by the parties. Official Yerevan saw such proposals as trading 
concessions over Karabağ and Baku's view also rejected Armenian route "…no 
matter what concessions [Armenia] makes over Nagorno-Karabakh."126  
In February 1995 the White House adopted a plan that changed the whole 
balance in the South Caucasus. The plan consisted of supporting third pipeline 
route from Baku through Tbilisi to the Turkish port Ceyhan. For the first time the 
idea was announced by US Assistant Secretary of State, Mark Grossman in his 
speech of January 1995. Turkey was supposed not only to be rewarded for the 
economic losses it suffered in the course of the Gulf War while rendering support 
to the United States, but the latter also intended to increase Turkey's influence in 
the Southern Tier, to strengthen the multiple pipelines doctrine by another route 
and to counterbalance Russia. 
Also, the oil transportation through this route would be cheaper than one 
from the Black Sea (whether through Georgia or Russia). In addition to the 
reasons mentioned, there was the Turkish Straits problem of overloading the 
Bosphorus and Dardanelles with lots of oil tankers and thus causing serious 
environmental threats, which could have been solved through Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) route. 
All in all, the United States tended to make clear that any pipeline had a 
chance to be built and exploited if it satisfied four main criteria: technical 
feasibility, commercial viability, geopolitical acceptability and environmental 
soundness. 
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                  Figure 2. Oil pipeline routes in the South Caucasus. 
What about the Baku-Gulf route and why can't it be built and applied in 
the same way? Three of the four criteria speak in favor of the route: the cost of 
the Iranian route is less than $1 billion which is three times cheaper than the cost 
of the BTC line; it is environmentally sound and has all chances to be built. Why 
then Washington used to oppose the route? The American position is justified by 
two explanations. The first one is geopolitical in nature and treats Iran as a state 
that supports international terrorism and that should be punished for this through 
dual containment policy. The second explanation is geoeconomic one: if the 
United States wishes to lessen its dependence on the Persian Gulf through the 
Caspian oil, it would be a big contradiction to support southern route through 
Iran which would increase and not lessen the significance of the Gulf. These 
were the motives that pushed the Americans to oppose any Iranian participation 
in the new oil game. That is why in 1995 the President Bill Clinton intervened 
personally and demanded ejection of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) 
from oil consortium in Azerbaijan. 
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The idea of developing oil in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea 
supposed the existence of such a sector. However, not all the littoral states 
(including Iran, Russia and Turkmenistan) acknowledged the fact and even 
demanded stoppage of all the oil exploration activities until the legal status of the 
Sea is resolved. While it's of no use here to elaborate on the history of the legal 
disputes, the US position in this regard is of paramount importance in author's 
view. Logically, the position in question was in line with the AIOC agreement. 
However, initially, the Americans supported only tacitly the sectoral division 
rather than joint ownership of the basin. But already in 1995, head of the State 
Department’s Energy Policy section, Glen Rase,127 called Russian idea of 
condominium "…a guarantee of inaction" and stated that "The Russian position 
must not be imposed on the states that prefer a more normal division of the 
Caspian…" and that Washington "…does not recognize any spheres of 
influence." A year later another high-ranked US official, James Collins presented 
a letter to President Aliyev from President Bill Clinton and stated that "…the 
United States would back agreements between all Caspian states on the division 
of the sea's resources and their intensive development - agreements which would 
"clearly define" ownership rights and allow unimpeded shipments in the Caspian 
region."128 
Overall, the whole oil adventure showed the strong link between energy 
and security in the region not only in the local states' perceptions but also for the 
United States. Ariel Cohen compares the struggle over control of the energy 
resources and pipeline routes with "the Great Game" of the early 20th century, in 
                                                 
127 See Stephen Blank, "Every Shark East of Suez: Great Power Interests, Policies and Tactics in 
the Transcaspian Energy Wars," Central Asian Survey, vol. 18, no.2, June 1999, p.155. 
128 Robert E. Ebel, "Energy choices in the Near Abroad: The Haves and Have-nots Face the 
Future," The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., 1997, p.31. 
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which the geopolitical interests of the British Empire and Russia clashed over the 
Caucasus region and Central Asia."129 
Geopolitical importance of the oil contracts for the United States and the 
West can be seen from the following interesting fact: in September 1995, there 
was a meeting at NATO Headquarters in Brussels where US experts on the 
region pointed to the possibility of extending the US security guarantees for 
Persian Gulf to the Transcaspian region.130 
In the end politics prevailed over economics and the United States has 
chosen the multiple pipelines not only to offer economic profits for consumers 
and producers, but also and first of all to increase security of both of them. 
Moreover, the US-sponsored multiple pipelines doctrine aimed to exclude Russia 
and Iran from dominating the oil development in the region. Of course, in 
Russia's case participation was encouraged but this participation had to be 
limited through the multinational character of the oil contracts. As Thomas Goltz 
fairly argues,  
Oilmen like to refer to this as the "internationalization" of the 
Azeri oil patch. But as the representative of the Japanese company 
Itochi suggested with a smile, it may be more accurate to think of it 
as "international insurance…Our question at this point is whether 
Azerbaijan - and, for that matter, Georgia and Armenia -will 
continue to exist as independent states in 20 years," he explained. 
"Multiple foreign interest in the oil sector seems to be the best 
means of insuring that the investments we make today will not 
evaporate tomorrow.”131 
 
The extension of the US dual containment policy to the South Caucasus 
was the reason why Washington from the beginning of oil development 
                                                 
129 See "The New "Great Game": Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia by Ariel Cohen, 
Backgrounder no. 1065, January 25, 1996, 
(http://www.heritage.org/library/categories/forpol/bg1065.html). 
130 See "Every Shark East of Suez: Great Power Interests, Policies and Tactics in the 
Transcaspian Energy Wars," Stephen Blank, Central Asian Survey, 1999, vol.18, no.2, p.152. 
131 Thomas Goltz, "Catch-907 in the Caucasus," The National Interest, Summer 1997, p.40. 
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supported non-Iranian multiple pipelines and eventually preferred Turkish 
variant. The "Islamic fundamentalism" dimension in the US perceptions of 
Iranian threat to the region was gradually replaced and removed by other clichés.  
Actually, Iran of the 1990s was not as revolutionary and destabilizing as 
Iran of the previous decade. As Jan Bremmer put it, "…Iran's strategy to broaden 
its ties in the region, have rarely extended to mosque building. Ironically, Turkey 
has been more effective in this regard, combining Islam with a Westward 
orientation and economic success - bringing it into much closer alignment with 
the aspirations of Southern Tier leadership."132 Also, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, 
allies of the US, have done as much as Iran and maybe even more to practice 
Islam in the region. Iran's policy was more pragmatic and aimed at having stable 
South Caucasus near its borders. So it was of no surprise that healthy relations 
and trade with Iran were practiced by all three Transcaucasian states: Iran was 
geographic neighbor of the local states and one could do nothing to annul 
geography.  
However, Iran's policy was not too cold and neutral and soon the US 
policymakers began to see the emerging bloc consisting of Iran-Armenia and 
Russia, which was often acting against American interest in the region. Iran's flirt 
with Armenia began when Tehran became the first Muslim state outside CIS to 
establish diplomatic ties with Armenia. Soon Iran became the second largest 
trading partner (Russia being the first one) and hence played a significant role in 
Armenia's economy.  
Also, the geopolitical and strategic friendship of traditional enemies - 
Russia and Iran - resulted in ten-year Treaty of Peace and Friendship in close 
                                                 
132 Ian Bremmer, "Oil Politics: America and the Riches of the Caspian Basin," World Policy 
Journal, vol.15, no.1, 1998, p.30. 
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cooperation against American and Azerbaijani plans for the Caspian Sea's 
delimitation and in the area of nuclear exchange. Summing up all this, the 
American foreign policy already in 1994 began to treat the Iran-Armenia-Russia 
triangle as directed against the US interests in the region and as "the top point" 
for the strategy of balancing it. So, anti-Iranian US Caspian policy resulted in 
freezing the development of Iranian export lines since 1996 when the well-
known legislation, Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)133 was passed by Congress 
and all foreign companies were liable for those sanctions if they invested more 
than $20 million in energy branch of Iranian economy. Surely, there was no talk 
about any pipeline with Caspian oil running through Iran. The only concession 
was made by the US President's executive order of May 1995 that allowed oil 
swaps "in support of energy projects in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and 
Kazakhstan."134 
There were two main consequences of the US oil companies' activities in 
the region and their subsequent lobbying in Washington. The first consequence 
was the relief of the notorious Section 907 in favor of Azerbaijan and, actually, 
in favor of oil companies. The point is that the companies in question were in a 
disadvantageous position as compared to European or Japanese firms: they 
couldn't receive the US Government-sponsored financial assistance and many 
contracts were often awarded to the companies from other countries. The White 
House surely knew the state of affairs and was seeking to remove the Section. 
This is seen from President Clinton's letter to President Aliyev written in 1994 
where the US President mentions unjust anti-Azerbaijanian character of the 
                                                 
133 The official reasoning for passing this Act were Iran' links to bombing of US troops in Saudi 
Arabia in 1996, hostility toward Israel and Middle East peace process and nuclear development. 
134 Richter, Anthony. "Great Expectations on the Caspian: Can US Policy Live up to Them?" In 
Succession and Long-term Stability in the Caspian Region. Cambridge, MA: BCSIA, 2000. See 
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legislation and about the efforts the US was doing to annul it.135 In the broader 
foreign policy perspective the United States' image suffered from this bill 
because giving $100 million to Armenia annually and nothing to Baku could not 
make Washington look like an honest or neutral actor.136 So, the logical outcome 
was at least to relive the Section, which was eventually done in 1996 through the 
New Foreign Aid Bill. The new legislation made it possible for the US President 
to determine whether nongovernmental assistance to Azerbaijan was sufficient or 
not. In the latter case, the President was enabled to send direct government-to-
government aid to Azerbaijan but only for humanitarian purposes.  
Another main consequence of the increased US interest in the Caspian 
energy was the diminishing role of the normative values in the US policy 
towards the region. Since the mid-1990s democratization principles were losing 
their importance and Realpolitik based on concrete interests (which, however, 
were disguised by different values like the human rights, democracy, etc) began 
to give clearer shape to the course of the US foreign policy in the South 
Caucasus. The treatment of the democratization level in Armenia and Azerbaijan 
became more or less equal with the US government beginning to issue almost 
similar post-election statements. All this was accomplished under the great 
influence of the oil interests. 
Having shifted from "Russia-first" policy to geopolitical pluralism, the 
United States began paying more attention to strengthening the real 
                                                 
135 Stephen Blank, "Energy and Security in Transcaucasia," Sept. 1994   
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136 While financial aid to Armenia put the latter on the second place in the world only after Israel, 
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independence of the NIS, including those in the South Caucasus. And "…the 
economic/oil interests that emerged in late 1994 provided a convenient rationale 
for engaging more intensively with the countries of Central Asia and the 
Caucasus."137 However, economic engagement couldn't survive alone and had to 
be accompanied by security/military dimension. 
 
 
2.3 MILITARY DIMENSION OF THE US POLICY 
 
After 1994 there was "no peace, no war" situation in the South Caucasus: 
the conflicts of the early 1990s were “frozen” by the hidden Russian hand and 
this gave Moscow very useful tool for manipulating the local states. Moreover, 
Russia had at the time a very solid military presence in the south Caucasus: both 
Georgia and Armenia allowed Russia in 1995 to post its military on their 
territories. Four bases in Georgia and three bases in Armenia were occupied by 
the Russian troops in a different way for every country: while Georgia was 
forced to sign the respective agreements, Armenia was interesting at letting 
Russian troops station on its soil. Azerbaijan became the only Transcaucasian 
state that managed to avoid Russian military presence on its territory. However, 
about 20% of its territory was still occupied and Moscow used Mountainous 
Karabağ as a powerful method to influence Baku.  
In these circumstances, the military dimension of the US policy was 
initially very modest "…recognizing the limitations on its capabilities there, 
reluctant to antagonize Russia, and uncertain about its interests in the region and 
                                                 
137 See Roland Dannreuther, "Can Russia Sustain Its dominance in Central Asia?" Security 
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whether they could be served by security engagement."138 Soon, this reluctance 
vanished as the US newfound interest in the region coincided with NATO's new 
post-Cold war strategy. The Alliance changed its main objective of territorial 
defense to the more outward-looking stance, which dealt also with the processes 
that happened outside its members' borders. Correspondingly, new mechanisms 
were contrived to project NATO's influence to these processes: humanitarian 
assistance operations, "peace support" operations, crisis management, etc. In the 
South Caucasus the most important instrument of NATO was Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) Program that was actually introduced in Brussels in 1994 and offered 
the former Eastern bloc countries military and political cooperation. No security 
cooperation was proposed and no security guarantees were extended for the 
Partner states. However, it would be wrong to state that PfP didn't increase the 
security of the participants. In order to understand this, one should just look at 
the objectives of the Program: 
 
i. promotion of civilian control over the military forces 
 
ii. carrying out joint operations with NATO "peace support" humanitarian 
missions aimed at improvement of peacekeeping and peacemaking 
skills.139 
 
                                                 
138 See Edmund Herzig, "The New Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia,"op cit, p.51. 
139 Azerbaijan for example "…dispatches motorized infantry company of 130 persons, unit of a 
civil defense (30 persons), unit of a medical service, two helicopter MI-8, training center for 
improvement of access to national services of the control over airways during flight of NATO 
countries' planes over territory of Azerbaijan." See Jannatkhan Eyvazov, "NATO and Military-
Political Aspects of Azerbaijan's Security," (http://bridge.aznet.org) 
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iii. developing interoperability between the forces of NATO allies and 
participants 
 
iv. training and assisting the military forces of participating states  
 
v. standardization process of the  military forces of the countries wishing to 
put their military on the row with those of NATO members. 
 
Though lacking the crisis management mechanism, the PfP, nonetheless, 
can contribute indirectly to reducing the conflicts between participants which are 
strongly committed to peaceful nature of the Program. 
 
All in all, the PfP norms and rules were as flexible as Anglo-Saxon 
Common Law and every interested party could choose the degree of participation 
it wished for itself. NATO documents describe PfP as offering, "…participating 
states the possibility of strengthening their relations with NATO countries, 
without the promise of eventual NATO membership."140 NATO documentation 
even points to the fact that active participants can be rewarded with NATO 
membership. This document from 1996 raised some hopes in Baku and Tbilisi 
but the point is that the NATO membership for the Partner states in the region 
was the only luxury members could not afford. 
As it was already mentioned above, the year 1994 was a sort of watershed 
for the US policy in the South Caucasus: "the Contract of the Century" and 
establishment of the PfP program were the events of the year. However, the 
                                                 
140 See R Bhatty and R Bronson, "NATO's Mixed Signals in the Caucasus and Central Asia," 
Survival, Autumn 2000, vol. 42, no. 3, p.131. 
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event that may have influenced the regional settings even to a greater extent was 
the Russia's invasion of secessionist Chechnya. The initial reaction of the White 
House was modest and in line with the previous "Russia-first" policy of the first 
Clinton Administration that mostly tended to placate Moscow. Paul B. Henze 
and S. Enders Wimbush criticize this approach as follows: "Beijing's suppression 
in Tien An Mien entailed barely 1% of the casualties and none of the destruction 
of property that the Russians were responsible for in Chechnya (not only against 
Chechens, but equally against Russians). If Beijing deserved to be ostracized, 
why not Moscow? Why go on tolerating Russian bullying of other ex-Soviet 
states? Why give every appearance of conceding a Russian entitlement to meddle 
in the affairs of the "Near Abroad"? Throughout a half century of decolonization 
America recognized no such entitlement by any other ex-imperial power."141  
Despite such a restrained attitude, there was one lesson the United States 
learned from the War in Chechnya. The outcome of this war made Washington 
understand the actual conventional military capabilities of Russia and namely 
showed Russia's weaknesses in this regard. In 1996 Washington lost much of its 
respect for Russia, proclaimed the Caucasus and Caspian a region of "vital US 
interests" and the US policy in the region became more assertive from the second 
half of 1996. But before becoming assertive the US made another concession to 
Russia. In May 1996 NATO countries led by Washington agreed to revise the 
CFE Treaty and let Russia increase its force levels in the Flank Zone. The United 
States neglected security concerns of two Transcaucasian states - Azerbaijan and 
Georgia - and those of Turkey and insisted there was no linkage between Russia's 
                                                 
141 See Paul B. Henze and S. Enders Wimbush, It goes on like that: "While the Clinton 
Administration gave no thought to imposing sanctions against Russia for its genocidal assault on 
Chechnya, it has tolerated a congressional embargo against Azerbaijan for defending itself 
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destabilizing activities in the region and the CFE Treaty's revision "…even 
though a treaty revision could legitimize Russian forces being used for this 
purpose."142 The US policymakers together with NATO members decided to 
maintain CFE Treaty in force for the purpose of peace and stability in Central 
and Eastern Europe. The latter region was thus preferred to the South Caucasus.  
Also there was a fear that Russia would anyway leave or violate the 
Treaty if not allowed to increase the forces' levels. Ignoring the region and 
placating Moscow, Washington shouldn't have been surprised when it was 
revealed in May 1997 that Russia actually did violate the Treaty in the 1994-
96143 through $1 billion sales of military equipments to Armenia.144 List of 
weapons included T-84 battle tanks, Scud-missile systems that are able to reach 
Baku, S-300 surface-to-air missile systems and MIG-29 aircraft.145 While 
continuing to sell arms to Armenia and maintain military bases in Armenia and 
Georgia, Moscow had to reduce its military troops' presence in the South 
Caucasus since the mid-1990s because of Russia's lack of economic capabilities 
and disastrous war in Chechnya. The general trend of this troops withdrawal can 
be seen from the tables below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
142 S. Frederick Starr, "Power Failure: American Policy in the Caspian," The National Interest, 
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Foreign Affairs, Vol.76, no.5, p.72. 
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Table 1:146 Russian ground forces in the South Caucasus. 
 
 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 
Georgia 20,000 20,000 20,000 22,000 8,500 8,500 8,000 5,000 
Armenia 23,000 10,000 5,000 5,000 5,500 - 4,100 3,100 
Azerbaijan 62,000 - - - - - - - 
  
 
Table 2:147 Russian troops involved in peacekeeping operations in the South 
Caucasus. 
 
 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 
Abkhazia - - 3,000 3,000 1,700 1,600 1,500 1,500 
South 
Ossetia 
1,000 1,000 750 750 600 500 500 500 
Mountainous 
Karabağ 
- - - - - - - - 
 
 
So, despite not always consistent course pursued by Washington, 
everything was in favor of a more active US policy in the region and the statistics 
shows that the number of PfP activities was increasing between 1994 and 1997. 
If in 1994 the Transcaucasian and Central Asian states did not participate in any 
NATO-sponsored operations, then next year they participated in six, then eleven 
and in 1997 in nineteen such operations.148 Every country of the region pursued 
its own degree of cooperation with NATO and the PfP.  
Georgia was the most active participant of the NATO programs in the 
South Caucasus. Such a close cooperation can be attributed not only to the 
personal characteristics of the Georgian President Shevardnadze whose 
unforgettable mission as the USSR Foreign Minister has always been appreciated 
                                                 
146 See Lena Johnson, "Russia, NATO and the Handling of Conflicts at Russia's Southern 
Periphery: At a Crossroads?" European Security, Vol.9, no.4 (winter 2000), p.48. 
147 ibid. p.49. 
148 See Robin Bhatty and Rachel Bronson,  "NATO's Mixed Signals in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia," Survival, vol.42, no.3, Autumn 2000, p.132. 
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by the West,149 but also to the Georgia's important geopolitical position at the 
crossroads between Europe and Asia. So, it was General Jeremiah McKenzie, the 
Deputy Chief commander of NATO forces in Europe, who became the first high 
ranked NATO official to visit three Transcaucasian states, including Georgia in 
Georgia in 1995. And it was Shevardnadze who made Tbilisi a sort of 
"conference hall" of NATO in the region by placing the Georgian capital at the 
disposal of NATO meetings and conferences on regional security.  
As for Azerbaijan, its first serious contacts with NATO began with 
President Aliyev visiting NATO headquarters in Brussels in April 1996. During 
the visit the Azerbaijan President asked for specific sorts of NATO military 
communications equipment and suggested that NATO assist training Azerbaijani 
units for peacekeeping purposes creating in Azerbaijan a modern defense 
program under civilian control.150 Armenia's stance toward PfP was cool enough 
due to the country forging close strategic cooperation with Russia. So, little 
interest was shown not only to the joint activities but also to the NATO-
sponsored regional conferences and meetings. 
Summing up, it were Azerbaijan and Georgia who preferred to use the 
PfP framework in order to escape geopolitical dependence on Russia and 
eventually possibly to shift their security relations to the West. So, while the PfP 
program officially pursued "inclusive" doctrine claiming to embrace all the 
former Soviet states including Russia, the events in the South Caucasus hinted at 
the signs of the "exclusive" option already in the years 1994-96. The region's de 
facto exclusion from Russian security ecumene and its drift to the NATO's 
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Southern Flank were seen as an important loss to the United States by the 
Kremlin. Moreover, the talk of the new European and/or Transatlantic 
architecture began at the same period of time and Caucasus was considered as 
the southeastern edge of this new architecture. The then NATO Secretary 
General Javier Solana visited Caucasus and stated that Europe cannot be fully 
secured with the South Caucasus being outside European security. The US-led 
PfP program was a very useful instrument not only for integrating the region into 
the European security system. The program also delivered a signal from the 
United States that it was there and accomplished this at a very low economic and 
political cost. These two achievements were reached through the US strategy of 
"extraordinary power projection."151 The latter meant engagement program that 
consisted of the abovementioned joint operations, visits and staff-to-staff 
coordination and implied reaching interoperability between the American or 
NATO forces and those of local states, access to regional military facilities and 
provides the common knowledge about local security environment. 
From the military and paramilitary viewpoint Washington relied mostly 
on a multinational framework and especially on NATO to strengthen the military 
structure of Azerbaijan and Georgia and safeguard their true independence while 
the United States was forging close contacts with Tbilisi, Turkey concentrated on 
the Azerbaijan's military reforms. The United States military engagement in the 
region was in line with its global military strategy: to create civilian defense 
system (as it is the case in Latin America) and to show the United States power 
projection capacities. There was actually another more concrete and more 
applied policy objective and namely prevention of new neoimperialistic Russia's 
                                                 
151 See "Every Shark East of Suez: Great Power Interests, Policies and Tactics in the 
Transcaspian Energy Wars," Stephen Blank, Central Asian Survey, 1999, vol.18, no.2, p.158. 
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emergence as this could threaten regional balances of power in the region called 
Greater Middle East, one of few most strategically important areas for the United 
States globally. What was achieved at the stage of the United States engagement 
in the South Caucasus was the survival of Georgia and Azerbaijan as 
independent or semi-independent states and prevention of Russia dominating the 
region. 
 
 
2.4 REGIONAL STABILITY  
 
In the meantime, the ethnic conflicts' development in the South Caucasus 
shifted from flaming wars to frozen peace. Actually, it was "no war, no peace" 
situation because neither peace treaties nor peaceful solutions were achieved 
between warring parties but rather mere cease-fire agreements signed. 
Approximately 15% of Georgian and 20% of Azerbaijani territories were not 
under respective governments' control. Russian policy principle "divide and rule" 
of the early 1990s contributed to the creation of three “frozen” conflicts in South 
Ossetia, Abkhazia and Mountainous Karabağ. Russia managed to deploy its 
peacekeeping forces (PKF) in Georgia under CIS mandate but was unable to do 
the same in Azerbaijan because of the latter's strong objections. The United 
States seemed to give Russia free hand in the regional conflicts and by 1994 was 
reaping the fruits.  The only framework within which the United States could 
somehow influence the events was the international organizations' framework.  
The UN role in this regard was very weak and the organization's limited 
participation was confined to issuing four resolutions of the Security Council on 
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Mountainous Karabağ (which were never implemented) and sending military 
monitors to Abkhazia in 1994. As for NATO, it could not intervene in the region 
firstly fearing Russia's radical reaction and secondly being profoundly engaged 
with Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, all parties except Armenia regarded 
NATO as neutral and objective organization. If Azerbaijan was encouraging the 
NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Mountainous Karabağ conflict and was 
pointing to the enormous resources of the Alliance to this end, then Armenia was 
scared of NATO's possible taking side with Azerbaijan and wanted only the 
United States to curb Turkey's aspirations in the region. As the then Armenian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Kazinian put it, "Armenia wants NATO to exercise 
influence with Turkey to encourage a peaceful solution."152 
While Moscow-led "CIS PKF" was stationed in Georgia, peace process in 
Mountainous Karabağ was carried out within the CSCE's framework, and namely 
within the CSCE "Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh" which consisted of some 
CSCE member-states and initial co-chairs. The only more or less progressive 
event occurred in 1994 was the OSCE decision to send the PKF to Mountainous 
Karabağ. Moscow was forced to vote for the plan despite the multilateral nature 
of the planned OSCE contingent.153 The situation changed a bit in the year 1996 
when the United States indicted that it was ready to take over the Minsk Group's 
co-chair position as the welcomed (especially in Azerbaijan) balance against the 
other two co-chairs - Russia and France.154 At the same time having withdrawn 
                                                 
152 See Philip Petersen, "Security Policy in Post-Soviet Transcaucasia," European Security, vol.3, 
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its own troops from Chechnya and having big stakes in the Caspian oil 
development Russia began to change its way of handling the conflict. Any new 
flash of violence could have resulted in possible political chaos in Baku and it's 
clear that stability there was the main prerequisite for oil development. The 
logical outcome of the US activeness and Russia's relative retreat was the Lisbon 
summit in 1996. Azerbaijan proposed there to negotiate the Mountainous 
Karabağ settlement on the basis of three broad principles which included 
preservation of Azerbaijan's integrity, Mountainous Karabağ's people right to 
self-determination through the "highest degree" of autonomy within Azerbaijan 
as well as security guarantees for the parties to the conflict. Vetoed by Armenia 
and, hence, not included in the Final Communiqué, the proposal still could 
survive as "Chair-in-office" statement, which was approved by all the OSCE 
member-states except Armenia. The most important thing here is that the 
compromise was sponsored by the United States.  
The Lisbon summit showed, therefore, that Washington's role in the 
conflict resolution sphere had grown and the geopolitical priorities of the White 
House in the region began to take shape. 
 
 
2.4.1 Non-Proliferation 
 
  Besides national security concerns over oil development, the United 
States had another important area in the South Caucasus to care about and, 
namely, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well as 
organized crime. In 1994 the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
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Investigations "…investigated the role of organized crime in the smuggling of 
military hardware and materials related to weapons of mass destruction out of the 
former USSR."155 And two years later the United States President's National 
Security Strategy for the first time pointed to the direct link between the United 
States National Security and "fighting international organized crime."156 The 
South Caucasus was considered as transit area for drugs on their way to Western 
Europe but the United States was even more concerned with region's importance 
from the non-proliferation viewpoint. Surely, the region's nuclear heritage could 
not be compared to that of Belarus, Ukraine or Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, only 
the acquisition of WMD by Armenia (in the form of ballistic missiles) makes the 
region top target for US policymakers. One also should take into account 
undeveloped MPC&A as well as non-proliferation export control system. All 
these problems taken together could lead to catastrophic consequences if not 
taken under control. The efforts to do the latter began in all Transcaspian 
republics in the year 1996 and the first event in the area was the Washington 
Forum on Export Controls and Non-proliferation for Senior Government 
Officials. At the forum United States Government officials made some briefings 
directed at the representatives of the South Caucasian and Central Asian states. 
As a matter of fact, the aim of the US non-proliferation policy was to prevent 
eight Caucasian and Central Asian countries from becoming a transit point for 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction leaking from Russia to the 
south. 
 
 
                                                 
155 See Rajan Menon, Yuri E. Fedorov, and Ghia Nodia ed., "Russia, the Caucasus and Central 
Asia," EastWest Institute, 1999, pp.206-207. 
156 ibid. 
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2.5 MAJOR DRAWBACKS  
 
There were some old and new drawbacks of the US policy, which need to 
be addressed here. 
 
 
2.5.1 Lack of coordination 
 
The policies of the First Clinton Administration in the region lacked 
coordination and general strategy replacing the latter with short-term tactics. 
Absence of coordination could be seen from the fact that each Department 
pursued its own policies towards the region and there was no one coordinating 
center that would have coordinated them. For instance, democratization tasks 
were split between USIA (US Agency for International Development) and the 
state Department. Another example was the creation of its own Ombudsman for 
energy and commercial cooperation with the NIS by the Department of 
Commerce in 1995.157 The situation began to improve during the second Clinton 
Administration when the jungle of the US Department's responsibilities were to 
be coordinated by the established Senior Interagency Group on the Caspian 
under the National Security Council. The importance of Transcaspian for 
Washington can be seen from the fact that this Group was the only permanently 
working one. So, the more coordinated policy if not strategy began to develop 
since 1996. 
 
                                                 
157 See Fiona Hill, "A Not-So-Grand Strategy: United States Policy in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia since 1991," Politique étrangère, February 2001,  
(http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/fhill/2001politique.htm). 
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2.5.2 Lack of well-defined goals  
 
Besides lack of coordination, narrow, short-term interests dominated the 
US policy's agenda in the region. As Leila Aliyeva put it, "…the USA was very 
slow and cautious in defining its interests in the region. Two sets of 
contradictions were characteristic of US policy towards the region: between the 
influence of the Armenian lobby and of US economic interests in the region, and 
between those interests and the fear of adversely affecting the political situation 
in Russia."158 These shakable and solidarity-lacking policies often undermined 
the image of the United States in the eyes of local states. Again, the well-known 
and four major principles of the US policy in the region already mentioned above 
began to be proclaimed more assertively at this stage and were also supported by 
certain actions. 
 
 
2.5.3 Contradictions in the policy  
 
Also, in 1995-96 there was lack of pragmatic and realistic approach to the 
region on the part of the United States: the so-called "win-win opportunities" 
concept began to be repeated by the United States policymakers in order to 
persuade Russians to cooperate and not to dominate in the region. The concept 
went on arguing that security is in Russia's interests both political and economic 
ones and in order to achieve stability Moscow should drop its neoimperialistic 
                                                 
158 See Leila Aliyeva "The Foreign Policy of Azerbaijan," Central Asian and Caucasian 
Prospects, Briefing Paper no.9, October 1996, (http://www.riia.org/Research/rep/bp9.html). 
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ambitions and become a good neighbor rather than bad spoiler for the local 
states.  
The win-win concept left Iran outside and the United States continued to 
support "Turkish model" as opposed to the "Iranian" one and introduced 
economic sanctions directed against Tehran. This dogmatic anti-Iranian stance 
was the cornerstone of the US policy strategy in the region and was criticized for 
this dogmatism by the American private sector and academic circles. It was this 
anti-Iranian policy that created eventfully conditions for the emergence of 
regional alignments. Anti-Iranian policy and win-win concept were hardly to go 
along with each other.  
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CHAPTER III: 
SOUTH CAUCASUS BECOMES THE REGION OF VITAL 
INTEREST FOR THE UNITED STATES (1997-2001) 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1997 was the year when the US realized the geopolitical importance of 
the South Caucasus and the strategic involvement's countdown began from this 
period onwards. The changes occurred in the US policymakers' minds first of all 
resulted in the internal alterations. The Cabinet of the Second Clinton 
Administration underwent some radical shift and soon included the new State 
Secretary - Madeleine Albright - who seemed to be more assertive in her words 
and activities than the previous State Secretary Warren Christopher. Her 
statement about the fact that "assistance to the strategically-located and energy-
rich democracies of Central Asia and the Caucasus is strongly in our national 
interest"159 was followed by the policy pursued in line with these words.  
The changes also included the appearance of the genuine specialists on 
the concrete region within the United States Government instead of the diplomats 
specializing on the former Soviet Union in general. In addition, the post of the 
US Special Envoy and permanently functioning inter-agency working group on 
the Caspian were created. The Caspian Basin's importance for the US was 
strongly emphasized for the first time in the speech of the National Security 
Advisor, Sandy Berger, in March 1997, when he "…singled out China, Turkey 
and the Caucasus as areas of special emphasis and stressed Washington's intent 
                                                 
159 See "Prepared statement by Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State, before the Senate 
Appropriations Committee Foreign Operations Subcommittee," Federal News Service, May 22, 
1997. 
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to step up its involvement in the Caucasus and Central Asia."160 The emphasis 
was repeated and added by the remark "a strategically vital region" by the 
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott in July of the same year.161 
The most important external strategic change as regards the region was 
the transformed perception of Azerbaijan. Oil and gas companies' lobbying 
activities in the US Congress and partly pro-Azerbaijanian Jewish lobby were 
enough to pave the way for the Azerbaijani President Heidar Aliyev's triumphal 
official visit to the United States in July 1997. The importance of the visit can be 
demonstrated by the contracts worth $10 billion signed with American 
companies. The last part of Heydar Aliyev's book released during his visit in the 
US and called "Azerbaijani Oil in the World History" showed the importance of 
the visit and increased US-Azerbaijani cooperation. The section in question was 
titled "A New Stage in Azerbaijan-American Relations." This perception was 
surely not only one-sided and the US policymakers had the similar feelings 
towards Azerbaijan and its oil and that was confirmed by very optimistic and 
maybe even consciously inflated number of 200 billion barrels. This was, 
according to the 1997 US Energy Department Report, the amount of the oil 
reserves that the Caspian Sea might hold.  
Z. Brzezinski could be happy to see his "geopolitical pluralism" concept 
prospering. The United States' main aim was to preserve the region of South 
Caucasus as a zone of free competition and not to let Russian imperialistic 
hegemony or Iranian conservative influence in. In order to achieve this objective, 
Washington had to be active in every international issue in the region. 
                                                 
160 See James MacDougall, "The New Stage In US-Caspian Sea Basin Relations," Central Asia, 
no.5, (11), 1997. (http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/st_04_dougall.shtml). 
161 Svante Cornell, "Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the 
Caucasus,” op cit, p.376. 
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3.2 MULTIPLE PIPELINES AND BAKU-TBILISI-CEYHAN PROJECT  
 
The United States' energy policy as applied not only to the South 
Caucasus but also to the whole Transcaspian region faced some alterations after 
1997. The focus was shifting slowly from the multiple pipelines doctrine to the 
strategy that still implied existence of several pipelines but aimed at singling out 
the most important one. The latter was eventually called Main Export Pipeline 
(MEP). In this regard Azerbaijan's very location as the gateway to Central Asia 
as well as its huge oil reserves let this country become the target area for US oil 
companies and, hence, for the US Government. The White House collaborated 
actively with American oil companies while forging the US Caspian energy 
policy. As James MacDougall wrote in 1997, "…While chiefly motivated by 
different reasons; the administration by business and politics and the oil 
companies by the promise of huge profits, the convergence of interests and the 
close cooperation between the major US oil companies and the administration is 
distinct. The policies of each can be viewed as mutually reinforcing."162 
The clear shift from a policy of supporting multiple pipelines to a single 
one was seen negatively in Moscow and criticized also in the West. The 
criticisms were pointed usually to the increased polarization in the region and to 
the US government taking into account not the commerciability of the project but 
its geopolitical importance and thus making US oil companies and itself hostage 
to the MEP decision. The whole picture however was not as simple as critics 
used to present it. 
                                                 
162 See James MacDougall, "The New Stage In US-Caspian Sea Basin Relations," Central Asia, 
no.5, (11), 1997. (http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/st_04_dougall.shtml). 
 88 
The first serious intention to create Baku-Ceyhan MEP was expressed by 
the signing of the Ankara Declaration in 1998. Because of the Russian concerns 
Washington delayed official announcement of the planned BTC route as the 
MEP. But the year 1998 was the time when a US high official and, namely, US 
Secretary of Energy Frederico Pena stated publicly that Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan was 
the most suitable route for the MEP concept. 
And the legal framework for the new route was accomplished in 1999 as 
the Istanbul Agreement was signed. The US President's Energy Advisor for the 
Caspian region, Richard Morningstar, also signed the agreement as an observer. 
He stated that this route was the only choice "for transporting the Caspian 
petroleum into the world market and explaining that the Straits were not 
convenient for the transportation of petroleum."163 
So, in addition to the TransCaspian Pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan began 
to be seen as the cornerstone of the US regional policy. The project included the 
transportation of Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli fields' oil of Azerbaijan to the Turkish 
Mediterranean port of Ceyhan through Tbilisi. All these three huge oil fields 
were expected to produce about 480,000 barrels of oil per day by 2005 (the date 
of planned completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline) and 1,2 million 
barrels per day by 2010.164 Moreover, after the World Bank's feasibility results of 
the BTC were announced in 1998, the project began to be considered as a real 
possibility by the US government.  
However, before the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project could become reality, 
the West needed some pipeline that would have been an alternative to the (by the 
                                                 
163 See Nesrin Sariahmetoglu, "A Look At The Matters of Route and Security of the Caspian 
Petroleum Pipeline," Perceptions, p.71. 
164 See Jan H. Kalicki, "Caspian Energy At The Crossroads," Foreign Affairs, vol. 80, no.5, 
Sep/Oct 2001, p.122. 
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time already functioning) Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline. So, the decision was 
taken to put into service the 830km pipeline between Azerbaijan and Georgia, 
which already existed though needed some repairing. The new terminal was 
constructed by 1998 in the Georgian town called Supsa and the same year the 
first Azerbaijani oil began to flow from Baku to the West on April 17, 1998. The 
line was of big importance for the region because in the words of the then foreign 
policy advisor of the Azerbaijani President Vafa Guluzade  
this pipeline gives Caspian countries a reliable way to export oil 
without going through Russia. It is hugely important economically, 
but even more important politically. Now, for the first time, we 
have direct access to the West freeing ourselves from Russia after 
200 years.165 
 
The project received support from Washington, but this support was not 
limitless because it was just ”early oil" and the United States considered Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan as the main priority and needed to implement it. So, it was no 
surprise when Washington gave full support to Ankara and Baku in the case of 
blocking expansion of the Baku-Supsa route. The Baku-Ceyhan route remained 
the main target of the United States and it had to be supported by any cost despite 
all the problems that existed.  
The bad times for the project were connected not only with Russia's 
opposition and Iran's intrigues in the Caspian but also with the oil prices. In the 
period between 1997 and 1998 low oil prices and contrastingly high cost of the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project made the latter's fate shaky. OPEC's (Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries) overflows of oil had a terrible effect on the 
whole post-Soviet market. Being $22 per barrel in October 1997, the crude oil's 
                                                 
165 See Taras Kuzio, "Geopolitical Pluralism in the CIS: The Emergence of GUUAM," European 
Security, vol.9, no.2, Summer 2000, pp.87-88. 
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price went down to $11,30 in June 1998.166 In addition to the oil prices there was 
also certain fear of Armenian weapons destroying the pipeline routes from 
Azerbaijan to Georgia. As Armenia obtained four Typhoon heavy missile rocket 
launchers in 1999, two of these deployed systems were considered as being able 
to hit the existing Baku-Supsa pipeline and planned Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
pipeline.167 
The event occurred in 1999 that changed the pessimistic view on Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan in a day - the discovery of large natural gas resources in the Shah-
Deniz field in Azerbaijan and the prospects of parallel pipeline to Turkey sharply 
increased chances of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan for success. The United States' 
support for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan was strengthening year by year and the 
reasons for such solid support can be formulated in four main frameworks: 
environmental, geographic, economic and geopolitical ones.  
Environmental advantages of the BTC route present the possibility to 
divert the oil tankers' traffic from the Turkish Straits and reduce the 
environmental problems there. Actually, adding Caspian oil to the already 
existing traffic would make it impossible for the Turkish Straits to cope with 
such a heavy burden.  
Geographic advantages include the access to the Mediterranean Sea and 
direct linkage to the Western European energy markets. Moreover, from the 
Mediterranean every point of the world could be reached as opposed to the Black 
Sea way.  
                                                 
166 See Charles van der Leeuw, "Oil and Gas in the Caucasus and the Caspian: A History," 
Curzon Caucasus World, 2000, p.151. 
167 See Gareth Winrow, "Turkey and Caspian Energy: The Importance of Geopolitics," Insight 
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Economic and commercial advantages include reaching the potentially 
lower tariffs than those applied to the Russian line, lower cost of one ton of oil 
(again $17 as opposed to $25 of Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline)168 and lower 
financial expenditures for the United States government because the latter refuse 
to pay for the pipeline and proposed only the participation of the United States 
government agencies, such as Eximbank and OPIC (The Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation).169  
In the latter case economic advantages are interpreted as the advantages 
for the US but not for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project, which risks not to 
become implemented because of the lack of sponsorship. Having analyzed the 
three frameworks one needs to point out that despite all these advantages and 
drawbacks mentioned the US pipeline strategy in the region was based on the 
geopolitical fundament and all other frameworks were to some extent dependent 
on it.  
Geopolitically, the BTC idea was a sort of a way out for the American 
policymakers' hope to solve three different tasks in their regional strategy. 
Firstly, the line would prevent Russia monopolizing the transportation of the 
Caspian oil and would link the Transcaspian states even more firmly into the 
Western economic system. Secondly, the route would exclude the main US 
enemy in the region - Iran - from the Caspian oil transit and the possibility of 
                                                 
168 See S.I. Cherniavskii, "US Strategy in the Caucasus," International Affairs (Moscow), 1999, 
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Iranian line. And, thirdly, the main US ally in the region, Turkey, would be given 
even greater influence leverage in the regional politics. 
The most important of these geopolitical priorities is surely Russia's 
future position in the regional politics. Completely shutting out Russia would be 
an unwise step that could entail serious political consequences beginning from 
"unfreezing" the ethnic conflicts in the regions to the direct Russian intervention. 
The greater US-Russian energy cooperation can offer political and economic 
profits to the United States. Economically, Russian involvement would provide a 
more secure environment for the local energy projects. Some Russian companies 
like LUKoil began investing in Azerbaijani oil and politically, this cooperation 
can reap many benefits. One of them is the Russian changed attitude on the 
Caspian Sea's legal status under the pressure of the Russian oil and gas 
companies.170 
  
 
3.3 US-LED NATO IN THE "SECOND GRAY ZONE OF INSECURITY"  
 
Military element of US involvement in the region also acquired a new 
level of is development after 1997. The main changes were taking place in the 
bilateral relations of the United States with the local states, increased 
collaboration in the multilateral framework of NATO as well as the creation of 
the anti-CIS bloc eventually called GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, 
Azerbaijan, Moldova). Russian military power's retreat after 1996 laid a good 
fundament for the increased US engagement in the region through NATO 
                                                 
170 In 1998 Russian reached agreements with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan over the demarcation of 
Caspian Sea on the median line principle, which was the one, supported traditionally by the 
United States and Azerbaijan. 
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mechanisms especially though good old PfP project. The region was called by 
the second Clinton Administration a "second gray zone of insecurity"171 because 
of political and military vacuum existing there. Caucasus presented a good 
example of out-of-area zone for NATO, which considered now the threats 
outside rather than within the NATO member-states' territories as the main 
threats. Surely the degree of cooperation between the US-led NATO and 
different local states differed. Georgia and Azerbaijan were the most advanced 
countries in this regard.  
The military exercises of NATO already mentioned in the Chapter II, 
were considered by both countries as higher priorities compared with the CIS 
military activities. NATO's military training was regarded as an attractive 
alternative even to the Russian military academies and the number of troops, 
types of contingent and other similar characteristics of Georgia's and 
Azerbaijan's participation increased both qualitatively and quantitatively.172 It 
was in 1997 when Azerbaijan deployed for the first time its contingent in NATO 
military exercises in Norway. During the North Alliance's operation in Kosovo 
Azerbaijan and Georgia sent their respective platoons there to take part in the 
operation within the Turkish contingent. Azerbaijan continued to modify its 
military doctrine according to that of Turkey and Azerbaijan’s officers were 
trained by the Turkish. As Azerbaijani military spokesman said in 2001,  "We 
participate more in NATO events than in the Commonwealth of Independent 
                                                 
171 See "In the Gray Zone," The Washington Post, May18, 1997, p. C6. 
172 For example, as Howard put it, "The commitment of local forces has increased from platoon to 
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States' joint exercises. Our armed forces attended 200 NATO events last year and 
this year this number will also be about 200."173  
Georgian President declared his country's intention to join NATO in 2004 
at the latest and although not all members of the Alliance would agree to the new 
members joining NATO the words of the US Navy Admiral Harold Gehmen 
about NATO's opened doors174 encouraged Georgians to some extent. Georgia is 
important for the Alliance as a major transit state for the Caspian oil's export and 
for the Eurasian Transport Corridor project.  
           Armenia's participation in the PfP activities since 1997 can be explained 
by the Armenians' fear of the Azerbaijan-NATO quickly developing relations 
and shouldn't be seen as a genuine wish to become interoperable part of the 
NATO's military component. Although there a talk in Armenia about 
complimentarity of its foreign policy and balancing between East and West, it's 
clear that after 1997 Armenia did not intend to drift away from Russia in favor of 
NATO as Georgia and Azerbaijan attempted to do. Russia remained number one 
military ally for Armenia and the latter's participation in the Partnership for 
Peace activities were only additional to the alliance with Russia. PfP activities in 
the Transcaucasian states were often linked to the bilateral relations with the US. 
The direct relationship exists, for instance, between the PfP and the US State 
Partnership Program, which is operated by the US National Guard. So, in many 
cases the US national military assistance was delivered in the framework of the 
PfP though such assistance had nothing to do with NATO's program. Thus, such 
activities were labelled by NATO as "in the Spirit of PfP." 
                                                 
173 See "Azeri army spokesman says military doctrine to rely on Turkey." BBC Monitoring 
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In its bilateral relations with Armenia Washington tried to somehow 
break or lessen the degree of Armenian-Russian military cooperation. As for 
Azerbaijan, the United States has signed the bilateral treaty on defense 
cooperation with Baku (as well as with Tbilisi) and tried to overcome the 
negative effect of the Section 907, which tended to limit the bilateral 
cooperation. However, the main target for US bilateral activities in the region 
was Georgia. The intensification175 of the bilateral cooperation began after 
Shevardnadze's visit to the USA. Washington approved the Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) program that resulted in Georgian purchases of military 
equipment from the United States. The United States also granted to Georgia 
$1.35 million to finance the purchase of US military radios, ten helicopters, 
funded construction of SU-39 and provided Georgia with two patrol boats, so 
that it could guard its borders in the Black Sea, which was seen in Washington as 
a very important task in the light of Georgia's genuine independence. Other 
assistance programs included different kinds of military training for the military 
and peacekeeping purposes. By 1998-99 the US became the main financial actor 
in the development of the Georgian military. 
The other indirectly US-sponsored bloc appeared in the region was 
GUUAM. It was the only organization in the post-Soviet space that did not 
include Russia and had clear anti-Russian176 and pro-Western attitude. The 
organization's initial name was GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, 
Moldova)177 and four countries began their collaboration in 1996 through issuing 
joint declarations at the CFE Treaty Conference in Vienna. Formally the 
                                                 
175 If there were 9 military contacts with in 1995 then in 1997 the number increased till 23. 
176 Though the GUUAM members insisted that the bloc is not directed against any state. 
177 GUAM is also the name of an island and strategic base in the Pacific controlled by the United 
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establishment of GUAM was announced a year later during the summit of the 
Council of Europe. Although the aims and activities of the organization were 
different and many-sided, its members were drawn together by four main 
reasons: integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and opposition to the Russian 
manipulations in the separatist ethnic conflicts, reducing energy dependence on 
Russia and trying to prevent the Russia-orchestrated CIS from monopolizing the 
post-Soviet geopolitical space.  
By 1998 the new element - military one - began to develop within 
GUAM and the similar178 concerns of the four countries as regards CFE Treaty's 
flank issues only facilitated the efforts of the GUAM members in this sphere. In 
May 1998 the countries announced their intention to create a peacekeeping 
battalion under the aegis of the UN to replace Russian peacekeepers in Georgia 
in the future. By the end of the same year the Georgian and Ukrainian officials 
proclaimed the establishment of the so-called "Eurasia battalion" to protect the 
pipeline with Azeri oil. This battalion would have been included within the 
NATO's PfP framework. The border troops cooperation was also proclaimed to 
be the common need of the four countries. The GUAM organization was not 
organization in the sense that it did not have organizational structures. Lack of 
institutionalization could be explained as the fear to attract the anger of the 
Russian hardliners. Of course, there were attempts to systemize the functioning 
process of the GUAM like the proposal of the Ukrainian foreign minister 
Tarasiuk. He proposed in 1999 to formally institutionalize GUUAM (Georgia, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova) beginning with GUUAM heads of 
                                                 
178 In Shevardnadze's words "GUUAM is an association of states with equal rights, determined to 
solve problems facing them by pooled efforts and consultations with one another." See Taras 
Kuzio, "Geopolitical Pluralism in the CIS: The emergence of GUUAM," European Security, 
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states' meetings at the UN or the OSCE summits and ending with the 
establishment of permanent GUUAM coordination offices in each member 
state.179 Also there were aspirations to achieve greater interoperability between 
GUUAM and NATO especially after the Washington summit in 1999 when the 
fifth member (Uzbekistan) joined the organization. If before this inflow members 
were speculating about "16+4" formula for GUAM and NATO, then after the 
event the new formula "19+5" appeared on the agenda of the GUUAM 
policymakers.180 An official working relationship between NATO and GUUAM 
was not achieved and GUUAM never received official recognition on the part of 
NATO. However, the latter was enabling the GUUAM member-states to upgrade 
military-related infrastructure, take part in military and paramilitary training and 
increase interoperability between two frameworks.  
The importance given to the GUUAM cooperation by the White House 
can be shown on the following example: in 1999 when the military units from 
Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan held some training devoted to the inauguration 
of the Baku-Supsa pipeline and associated with a pipeline protection, the event 
was observed not only by the Presidents of the three republic but also by some 
US officials. In 1999 Zbigniew Brzezinski called GUUAM "good initiative" that 
might evolve into a security system.181 
Toward the year 2001 the United States' interest in GUUAM had grown 
significantly.   When the cooperation seemed to break up with Uzbekistan and 
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Moldova drifting away towards Russia, it were the US incentives that kept all 
five countries on the track.182 
Looking at the geostrategic balance in the region one could clearly see 
two opposing groups or alignments being present in the region - the north-south 
alliance (Russia, Armenia, Iran and maybe Greece) and east-west alliance (the 
United States, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan). The region is the 
crossing point of these alignments and the shakable balance can be broken every 
moment by the wrong policy by the powers involved, including the United States 
policy. 25-year basing right for the Russian troops in Armenia, Guluzade's 
statement about the possibility of stationing a NATO, American or Turkish base 
on Absheron, Russian new military doctrine's proposition about the nuclear 
attack in case of any Western military action within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States - all these facts speak for the region's potential volatility and 
fragility of peace in the South Caucasus. On the one hand, Washington's policy 
was wise enough to avoid direct commitment of US troops to the region. But on 
the other hand, the US position should not be as ambivalent as it was and should 
continue strengthening military cooperation with both Georgia and Azerbaijan. 
As history shows, despite being reluctant to risk troops in the ethnic conflicts, the 
United States always seemed to prefer keeping its military forces "…in the 
vicinity of regions it considers important for its national interests."183 
Summing up, the increased strategic engagement of the US in the energy 
sphere coincided or even facilitated the same kind of military involvement which 
was, however, wisely arranged so that not to be too aggressive. 
                                                 
182 See Anatol Lieven, "GUUAM: What Is It, and What Is It For?" Eurasia Insight, June 22, 2002 
(http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav121800.shtml). 
183 Svante Cornell, "Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the 
Caucasus," op cit, p.390. 
 99 
 
3.4 VERSATILE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
 
The third sphere that received the increased attention of the US policy 
after 1997 was regional stability. The latter concept includes first of all conflict 
resolution as the main cause for the stability in the region. Also one can single 
out such areas like humanitarian assistance or Eurasia transport corridor. The fact 
that the conflict resolution area was given increased attention by Washington can 
be seen from the US budget allocated for the budget law "On Allocating 
Financial Aid to Foreign States." The latter intended to provide the south 
Caucasian states with $228 million. Out of this sum, 17.5% had to go to the 
settlements of the conflicts in Abkhazia and Mountainous Karabağ. The US 
began to focus more on Abkhazia and the Mountainous Karabağ process was 
also not forgotten by the US policymakers. The US could act now as the co-
chairman of the Minsk Group and the American Special Negotiator for 
Mountainous Karabağ and Regional Conflicts in the Newly Independent States, 
Strobe Talbott was appointed and declared that the "Job One" for the US policy 
in the region was nothing but conflict resolution. In 1997-98, however, the 
political situation in Abkhazia and Mountainous Karabağ was characterized by 
respectively the guerrilla warfare and deadlock in negotiations. 
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3.4.1 Abkhazia 
 
  The United States' involvement in Abkhazia was based on the assumption 
that Russia's attempts to reach the peaceful settlement of this frozen conflict were 
fruitless. The ineffective Russian attempts of conflict resolution, so the US, 
should have been replaced by the instruments of the United Nations. The 
examples of such tools were the Geneva Group and the Friends of Georgia 
Group. As it was already mentioned, the American Administration was providing 
financial assistance and was ready to provide more if the Georgian refugees 
returned into the Gali district. The Friends of Georgia Group, established in 1997 
and having the United States (along with Germany, Russia, France, the United 
Kingdom) pursued negotiations with the parties of the conflict outside the formal 
network of negotiations. The only positive outcome of this Group's efforts was 
the fact that the conflict was further internationalized. From the military 
viewpoint the Russian/CIS peacekeeping troops deployed in Georgia had the 
upper hand in the conflict resolution process and the Kremlin could manipulate 
and influence the events there.  
The US was somewhat present in the region by rendering support to the 
UNOMIG, which played a secondary role in the process and had to monitor the 
activities of the CIS peacekeepers. Military engagement of the United States 
whether unilaterally or in the framework of NATO had yet to be realized. So, 
when Shevardnadze called for an international "peace enforcement operation in 
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Abkhazia on the Bosnian model"184 no approving sign came from the White 
House. Earlier in 1997, the Georgian President tried to convince the United 
Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the US President Bill Clinton to 
intervene in the conflict but both leaders' reactions were negative. There were 
actually two reasons for such an attitude on the part of the United States: 
overburden with other peacemaking missions and what is more important, the 
reluctance to provoke Moscow's anger. 
So, Washington preferred not to rely on the military power and instead 
concentrated its efforts on the increased diplomatic ways of reaching the 
solution. Russia in this context was seen by the US as the barrier to the 
successful settlement, so every retreat of Russian military presence in Georgia 
was considered as a progress of the settlement and prologue to Western 
involvement. 
 
 
3.4.2 Mountainous Karabağ 
 
The US interest in the Mountainous Karabağ conflict was confirmed by 
the activities by the American co-chairs of the Minsk Group. The very 
appointment of the Special Representative on Mountainous Karabağ negotiations 
with the rank of Ambassador "…represented an overt recognition of the vital 
nature of American interests in the orderly functioning of oil and gas pipelines in 
                                                 
184 See Glen E. Howard, "NATO and the Caucasus: the Caspian Axis," in Stephen J. Blank ed., 
NATO After Enlargement: New Challenges, New Missions, New Forces, September 1998, p.203. 
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the region."185 The Minsk Group worked out several proposals since 1997 and 
generally the US position in all of these proposals remained confined to the 
recognition of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. As the then US Ambassador in 
Yerevan Peter Tomsen said: "No country recognizes Karabakh's independence. 
This is US policy and it is the policy of the OSCE. In other words all of these 
countries (53 out of 54) recognize the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, and that 
Karabakh is within the borders of Azerbaijan."186 But when the Armenian 
President Ter-Petrosian was inclined to accept the 1997 proposal of the Minsk 
Group, Armenian hardliners ousted him. The second proposal of the Minsk 
Group about "common statehood" between Azerbaijan and Mountainous 
Karabağ was unacceptable for Baku. Since summer 1999 both Azerbaijan and 
Armenia being unsatisfied with Russia's lack of interest in resolving the conflict 
agreed to negotiate the settlement in the bilateral talks under OSCE auspices. 
This new framework of negotiations was actively supported by the United States.  
Moreover, there was another shift in the US handling the conflicts and 
namely the rendering pressure on Armenia. "The actions taken by the 
government of Armenia in the context of the conflict over Mountainous Karabağ 
are inconsistent with the territorial integrity and national sovereignty principles 
of the Helsinki Final Act. Armenia supports Mountainous Karabağ separatists in 
Azerbaijan both militarily and financially. Mountainous Karabağ forces, assisted 
by the units of the Armenian armed forces, currently occupy the Mountainous 
Karabağ region and surrounding areas in Azerbaijan. This violation and the 
restoration of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan have been taken up by the 
                                                 
185 See Robert M. Cutler, "US Interests and "Cooperative Security" in Abkhazia and Karabağ: 
Engagement versus Commitment?" in Mehmet Tutuncu ed. "Caucasus: War and Peace," p.136-
137. 
186 Svante Cornell, "Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the 
Caucasus," op cit, pp.378-79. 
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OSCE,"187 - these are the words of the US President Bill Clinton. They 
characterize the changed US position on the issue. Consequently, the United 
States not only was threatening to cut the annual aid to Armenia but also 
preferred to look for the solution being guided by the formula "more than 
conventional autonomy but less than outright independence."188 However, such 
pressure still did not bring any positive results and even the US-sponsored Key-
West talks were not enough to reach the settlement. 
 
 
3.4.3 Humanitarian Assistance  
 
The humanitarian assistance of the United States is closely connected to 
conflict resolution and regional stability as a whole. By the year 1997 cumulative 
obligations (1992-1997) for US assistance to Caucasus and Central Asia totalled 
approximately $2.5 billion.189 In 1997-98 the picture for humanitarian assistance 
for the region began to change in several directions. 
Firstly, the general trend was that the US government began to shift its 
attention from humanitarian to development assistance. As regards Georgia, the 
US has given increased attention to the country since 1997. The efforts were 
made to enact the bills that would have made Georgia the recipient of nearly the 
same US aid going to Armenia. Of course, senators haven't succeeded in making 
                                                 
187 See William J. Clinton President of the United States of America (Cited from Presidential 
Determination (PD) No. 99-8 of December 8, 1998, and PD No. 98-11 of January 26, 1998, 
Memorandum for the Secretary of State, Re: "Assistance Program for the New Independent 
States of the Former Soviet Union.") 
188 See Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, "GUUAM and the Future of CIS Military Cooperation," 
European Security, vol.9, no.4, Winter 2000, p.102. 
189 See Nancy Lubin, "New Threats in Central Asia and Caucasus: an Old Story With a New 
Twist," in  Rajan Menon, Yuri E. Fedorov, and Ghia Nodia ed. "Russia, The Caucasus and 
Central Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment," EastWest Institute, 1999, p.222. 
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Georgia the second recipient in the world but, nevertheless, such trend could be 
regarded as positive. Georgia received "...$5.35 million in FMF funds in 1998, 
and $7.9 million in 1999."190 As always, Armenia's situation in this regard was 
sound. As Michael Dobbs put it, "Despite plentiful evidence of corruption and a 
patchy record on democracy and human rights there Congress has voted six years 
in a row to increase aid for the nation of 3 million beyond levels requested by the 
Clinton Administration."191 In 2000 Armenia was receiving $42 per person, 
which was an enormous indicator as compared to other countries: $34 per head 
for Bosnia, $1 for Rwanda, and $1,40 for Russia.192 Regarding the regional state 
of affairs a completely illogical situation emerged when the country with 3,5 
million population received $619 million country with 5,5 million population - 
$443 million and the most populated regional country (7,5 million) only $92 
million.193 
Analyzing Azerbaijan in this context, one needs to underscore the fact 
that Washington at last began not only to understand the necessity to repeal the 
Section 907 but also to make some concrete efforts for this purpose. In a letter to 
Bob Livingston, chairman of the house of Representatives Appropriations 
Committee, Madeleine Albright stated in September 1998 that the Section 907 
"...damages US national interests by undermining the administration's neutrality 
in promoting a settlement in Mountainous Karabağ, its ability to encourage 
economic and broad legal reforms in Azerbaijan, and efforts to advance an East-
                                                 
190 See Robin Bhatty and Rachel Bronson, "NATO's Mixed Signals in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia," Survival, vol.42, no.3, Autumn 2000, pp.133-34. 
191 See Michael Dobbs, The Washington Post, Jan 24, 2001, p.A01 "Foreign aid Shrinks But Not 
For All." 
192 ibid. 
193 See "Aid to Armenia" - Washington Post Editorial (March 1, 1997). 
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West energy transport corridor."194 The process of the Section’s elimination has 
begun and it lasted four years before the provision was repealed. The Section was 
nearly repealed in 1998 when many political leaders of the US Government as 
well as the former American political actors called for repealing the Section. 
They were followed also by the American oil companies and Jewish lobby in the 
US. The then Speaker of the House of Representatives Robert Livingston 
proposed the special Section that would have repealed the Section 907 and on 
September 17, 1998 the votes couldn't achieve this objective stated: 182 
Congressmen voted to repeal the Section while 231 Congressmen against it. 
Nevertheless, The US Congress agreed to add some exceptions to the Section 
like providing financial sources to Azerbaijan for humanitarian needs, prevention 
of creation and proliferation of WMD, democratic development, and within the 
framework of the Trade and Development Agency. Another two exceptions 
allowed Eximbank and OPIC to implement their programs in Azerbaijan.195 
When in March 23, 1999 the US Congress passed the Silk Road Strategy Act, it 
de facto repealed the Section because the Act gave the US President the right to 
waive the Section if it is in the interests of the United States. 
Overall, the United States' assistance to the regional countries has 
increased since 1997 and shifted from the earlier humanitarian concerns to the 
development and state-building needs of the recipients. The Section 907 was still 
in force and it was main irritant in the US-Azerbaijani relations and prevented 
the United States to fully engage itself with this country strategically important 
for Washington. 
                                                 
194 Svante Cornell, "Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the 
Caucasus," op cit, p.377. 
195 See S.I. Cherniavskii, "U..S. Strategy in the Caucasus," International Affairs (Moscow), 1999, 
p.58. 
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3.4.4 East-West Corridor  
 
The idea of the East-West transportation and energy corridor has found 
its continuation at the third stage of United States' involvement in the region. 
Having understood the importance of the region the United States Congress 
passed legislation in 1997 for fiscal year 1998. This act became known as "Silk 
Road Strategy Act of 1997" and made available $250 million for the south 
Caucasus. This sum covers reconstruction and remedial activities in the region, 
developing border security infrastructure, training border and customs control 
officers, urban and commercial development, implementation and eventual use 
of ferries, airports, fiber optics and modern highways.196  
The whole legal and regulatory framework of the project is contained in 
the Basic Multilateral agreement signed on 7-8 September 1998 during the 
International Transport conference on the Revival of the historic Silk Road. The 
main protagonists of the conference were Azerbaijan and Georgia and it's no 
surprise that despite the name the main focus of the conference was made not on 
the transport but on oil and gas. The idea of the Silk Road is very important not 
only for the local states as a means to get the access to the world of globalization 
but also for the United States. The latter has vested geopolitical and commercial 
interests here.  
The strategy would help American investment and new jobs for the 
Americans in the whole region from China to Romania, which represents truly a 
national interest of the United States. The US geopolitical interests can also be 
                                                 
196 See Mamuka Kudava and Cassady Craft, "Developing Non-proliferation Export Controls in 
Georgia in the Context of the emerging Eurasian Transportation Corridor," in  Gary K. Bertsch, 
Cassady B. Craft, Scott A. Jones, & Michael D. Beck, eds, "Crossroads and Conflict: Security 
and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia," 2001, p.224. 
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served here by excluding Iran from the project and offering the security-related 
assistance to the states-participants. However, excluding Russia from the project 
would have more negative than positive consequences and hence in our view 
Moscow should be encouraged to participate as equal in the game. 
 
 
3.4.5 Non-proliferation 
 
Non-proliferation activities of the US government in the region continued 
to evolve progressively. In December 1997 Madeleine Albright told Foreign 
Ministers of NATO member-states that "…the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction from the Middle East and Eurasia are dangerous threats to Europe 
and place the continent at considerable risk."197 The growing importance of 
Central Eurasia for the United States' non-proliferation actions was proved to be 
real with the US and Azerbaijani governments cooperating in the area of non-
proliferation despite the Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act "…due to the 
perceived contribution of these programs to the national security of the United 
States."198 This cooperation turned out to be successful. One of the examples is 
the arrest by Azerbaijani government of a shipment including Russian nuclear-
capable ballistic parts, which were heading for Iran in April 1998.199 Even the 
greater attention of the US policymakers was given to Georgia. The collaboration 
                                                 
197 Glen E. Howard, "NATO and the Caucasus: the Caspian Axis," in Stephen J. Blank ed., “Nato 
After Enlargement: New Challenges, New Mıssıons, New Forces,” September 1998, p.164. 
198 See Cassady Craft, "Reconciling Disparate Views on Caucasus Security: Non-proliferation at 
a Vital Crossroads," in Gary K. Bertsch, Cassady B. Craft, Scott A. Jones, & Michael D. Beck, 
eds, "Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia," 
2001, p.239. 
199 22 tons of stainless plates used to build ballistic missiles were seized by the Azerbaijani 
customs. See "Baku Stops Missiles Bound for Iran," Washington Times, April 25, 1998, A9. 
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included many fields. For example, in 1997 the draft on Export control Law was 
developed in cooperation with the experts from the US Department of 
Commerce. Also, the so-called CTR II (Cooperative Threat Reduction) 
assistance program was extended to Georgia providing equipment and training 
for export controls and the safe storage of weapons materials. The agreement on 
the "Cooperation in the Area of Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction and Promotion of Defense and Military Relations" signed by 
Georgia and the United States also meant cooperation in the following areas:  
 
i. establishing verifiable measures against the proliferation of WMD and 
technology, materials, and expertise related to such weapons from 
Georgia;  
ii. preventing unauthorized transfer and transportation of nuclear, biological, 
or chemical weapons and related materials; and  
iii. promoting defense and military contacts and other cooperative military 
activities.200 
 
Generally, all these assistance and cooperation programs had the purpose 
of enhancing the US global and regional non-proliferation policy as well as to 
encourage the regional states to integrate fully into the international non-
proliferation system. 
 
 
                                                 
200 Mamuka Kudava and Cassady Craft, "Developing Non-proliferation Export Controls in 
Georgia in the Context of the emerging Eurasian Transportation Corridor," in  Gary K. Bertsch, 
Cassady B. Craft, Scott A. Jones, & Michael D. Beck, eds, "Crossroads and Conflict: Security 
and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia," 2001, pp.223-24. 
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3.4.6 Democratization 
 
The US democratization agenda in the South Caucasus was not as 
successful as its other activities. The Transcaucasian countries with more 
autocratic than democratic regimes (although to a different extent in different 
countries) made the US policymakers reduce its attempts of inducing 
democratization in the region. While having the human rights situation that was 
far from Western model the local states (except Armenia) have taken loyal pro-
American stance. So, it was sooner energy and security issues that dominated the 
US policymakers' minds and as Stephen Blank put it, "…little pressure is being 
directed towards democratization of local governments. Political conditionality 
as a prerequisite of investment, trade, and aid is fast receding in visibility 
throughout the area and in US policy as well."201  
Balance of power became a more useful tool for the US policy than 
preaching law-based market democratic systems. Some authors call for the US 
policy to support both stability and democracy in the region,202 which is hard to 
imagine because democracy is nearly impossible without stability.  
In this regard it would be useful to cite President Aliyev’s words on the 
issue: " I believe the greatest fortune for America has been that since the North-
South [Civil] War [1861-1865], there have been no wars on America's land. In 
contrast, consider how many wars have been fought on European territory. 
Azerbaijan has become an independent state now, but Armenia is still occupying 
our territory [since 1992]. And even here in Azerbaijan, there is a struggle for 
                                                 
201 See Stephen J. Blank, "US Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia," June 
2000, p.7(http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs2000/milengag/milengag.pdf). 
202 See, for example, Ian Bremmer, "Oil Politics: America and the Riches of the Caspian Basin," 
World Policy Journal, Spring 1998, p.33. 
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power. There are armed groups and other criminals. In such a situation, it's 
impossible to bring democracy from America and impose it here.”203 So, 
"Stability must come first" - was the lesson the US had to learn from the regional 
politics. The democratization issue was not removed from the US regional 
agenda but it became secondary rather than one of the primary concerns for 
Washington. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
203 See Betty Blair, “Envisioning the Nation,” Azerbaijan International, Autumn 2001 (9.3) 
Interview: Azerbaijan's President, Heydar Aliyev 
(http://www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/93_folder/93_articles/93_aliyev.html). 
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CHAPTER IV: 
AFTER 9/11 
 
The last stage of the increased strategic engagement of the United States 
in the region has taken place after the well known "9/11" event - the terrorist 
attack on the American homeland.  
The general change in the United States policy after this event was the 
shift of geopolitical US priorities from European to Asian continent. The United 
States is obviously satisfied with its positions in Europe and Central Eurasia 
becomes now one of the most important areas for Washington. George Kennan's 
words said in 1947 about Central Eurasia's significance in the international 
relations system now became very actual: " any world balance of power means 
first and foremost a balance on the Eurasian land mass."204 In the "post-post-Cold 
war era"205 the Transcaspian region as the heart of Central Eurasia and crossing 
point between strategic balance of power systems in Europe, Middle East and 
Asia.  
The war in Afghanistan surely influenced many regions of the world and 
the South Caucasus was one of the regions where the geopolitical situation 
changed as the anti-terrorism campaign's flames began to burn. The influences of 
the campaign as applied to the region were the strategically increased US 
position in Georgia, the strengthened military cooperation between Turkey, 
Georgia and Azerbaijan, the waiver of the Section 907, the changes in the 
                                                 
204 See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Post-war 
American National Security Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 39. 
205 The words of US Secretary of state Collin Powell: "Not only is the cold War over, the post-
Cold War period is also over." See “US Envoy In Azerbaijan Comments On Nagorno-Karabakh 
Peace Process,” Q&A With Ross Wilson: 11/29/01 
(http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/qanda/articles/eav112901.shtml). 
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security-energy linkage of the US policy in the region, seemingly cooperative 
attitude of Russia, increased importance of the Caspian oil.  
The first important development was the cooperation between the US and 
the South Caucasus states, mostly Georgia and Azerbaijan, which gave 
unequivocal support to the US and offered unlimited access to their air space. 
Armenia was more careful in this context and this is understandable206 taking 
into account its common air defense system agreed with Russia. Such a support 
should be seen as a major factor in the US-led campaign due to the fact that it has 
given the US real air access to Central Asia and Afghanistan. The US response 
was immediate and positive. Washington lifted the eight-year ban on weapons 
sales to the local states. Pretty big amounts of military aid for Armenia and 
Azerbaijan ($4.4 million) were promised to both countries in March 2002 to 
"…counter threats such as terrorism, to promote peace and stability in the 
Caucasus, and to develop trade and transport corridors."207 Armenia's new 
geopolitical reality with the strengthened US-oriented Turkey-Georgia-
Azerbaijan alignment was really hard. Armenian foreign minister Varten 
Oskanian called, therefore for the good old "complimentary foreign policy" to 
avoid the country's isolation in the region. Armenia's attempts to forge closer 
contacts with Ankara can only be approved and greeted by the US. It is actually 
Washington that pressurizes Ankara and Yerevan to begin bilateral cooperation.  
On the other hand, however, there are tensions between Georgia and 
Armenia due to the problems in Javakhety (and Russian hand is felt there again). 
                                                 
206 Several days before the sanctions were imposed, "the US Ambassador to Armenia, John 
Ordway, issued what now looks like a veiled warning that Yerevan has gone too far in cementing 
its links with the Islamic Republic." See Emil Danielyan, “US Sanctions Expose Unease Over 
Warm Ties Between Yerevan and Tehran,” Eurasia Insight, 5/18/02  
(http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp051802.shtml). 
207 See Aynura Akhmedova, “Azerbaijan, Georgia Move To Secure Oil Pipelines,” 4/21/02  
(http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/pp042102.shtml). 
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Moreover, deepening Armenian-Iranian ties revoke anger in Washington. Recent 
sanctions on some Armenian firms due to their contacts with Iran in the nuclear 
sector aimed at prohibiting their production selling in the US and forbidding 
these firms from receiving US governmental assistance.  
Azerbaijan's increased military cooperation with the US result in the 
possibility when two states "…would work together to ensure maritime security, 
to maintain constant control over the air space and support stability in the 
region."208 The new shape in US-Azerbaijani relations was also accompanied by 
removing the constant irritant for Azerbaijan, the Section 907. It was Collin 
Powell who persuaded the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to lift the 
provision so as to thank Azerbaijan for cooperating with Washington in 
intelligence and airspace matters mentioned above. US Embassy in Azerbaijan 
expects Washington to provide about $50 million to Baku in 2002 and although 
this sum is less than that for Georgia and Armenia ($90 million) repealing the 
Section (even till 31 December, 2002) was a very positive and promising step on 
the part of the US towards further cooperation with such a strategically 
significant country. 
Georgia obviously gained most among the South Caucasian states from 
the 9/11 event and the antiterrorist campaign as regards the military cooperation 
with the US. For the first time in history the US decided to deploy its troops in 
the Caucasus region. Generally the military support for Georgia included $64 
million, deployment of 180 troops to train Georgians for anti-terrorism purposes. 
The eventual aim of the training is the Pankisi gorge where Al Qaeda fighter are 
                                                 
208 Visiting Azerbaijan in March 2002, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Eurasia Policy, 
Mira Ricardel also noted "US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pins "great hope" on the 
Caucasus states - Azerbaijan in particular." See Igor Torbakov, "Russıa Struggles To 
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belived to find a shelter while getting finances from Bin Laden. The speculations 
about significance of such a nearly unprecedented move (only in Philippines 
there are some Pentagon troops which render advisory services to local forces in 
anti-terrorism matters) for the US is many-sided: the action can put pressure on 
the whole Russian southern flank, Georgia can be later used for attacks on Iraq, 
etc.  
The most important aspect of the deployment, however, is its direct 
influence on the security of the Azerbaijani oil. The point is that the US military 
(even in the form of military training) presence in the region could strengthen the 
proposition that "…routes selected for oil exports from the Caspian would 
determine the region's geopolitical orientation."209 
Caspian oil became surely more valuable for the US after 11 September 
2001. Oil diversification, weakening OPEC and Gulf monopoly, lowering world 
oil prices, providing Turkish market with oil and gas - all these possible effects 
can become reality if the BTC oil pipeline (along with parallel Baku-Tbilisi-
Erzurum gas pipeline). The problem of the pipelines sponsorship should be 
overcome for the purpose of the ultimate success of the venture and this depends 
mostly on the US. The point is that the latter has great influence in the IFIs 
(International Financial Institutions) and also can help financially through direct 
governmental assistance or through he US Export-Import Bank.210 
On June 19, 2002, the official Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan opening ceremony 
marked the start of the pipeline's construction which is to last 32 months, cost 
                                                 
209 See Ruseckas, Laurent. "US Policy and Caspian Pipeline Politics: The Two Faces of Baku-
Ceyhan." In Succession and Long-term Stability in the Caspian Region. Cambridge, MA: 
BCSIA, 2000. (http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/pubs/ruseckas). 
210 The Eximbank is expected to decide by fall 2002 whether to support financially the BTC 
pipeline project or not. 
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about $2.9 billion211 and carry 50 millions tons of oil a year. Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Turkey are the strongest supporters of the idea of pipeline security. Ilham 
Aliyev, the vice-president of SOCAR, would like to see, for example, three 
regional countries plus the US as the main guarantors of the pipeline's 
implementation. The concrete steps were taken in this direction and include the 
bilateral military agreement between Azerbaijan and Georgia (April 2002) aimed 
at increasing pipelines' security as well as the tripartite agreement between 
Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan signed for the same purpose. The hints were 
also made that US or NATO would protect the pipelines in the region and so the 
US military presence in Georgia is perceived by the regional and outside powers 
as well as by the investors in the sense that the pipelines in the volatile South 
Caucasus should be protected. So, the United States' involvement in the region 
shifted the main concern from the question of the pipeline's actual construction 
and implementation to the security guarantees for the routes.  
The United States' active policy in the region is always regarded in the 
light of US-Russian relations and the last events show that the Transcaspian 
region became the major factor in the bilateral security relations. The most 
important shift occurring in the Russian foreign policy is the appearing 
understanding that only cooperation and constructive relationship with all local 
states and the United States rather than aggressive policy would increase Russia's 
benefits and influence in the region. Russian positive attitude towards the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and more or less realistic position on the Turkish 
diplomatic and military activities in the Caucasus give hope for future genuine 
cooperation. As Ariel Cohen put it, "…to become richer, Russia needs American 
                                                 
211 Turkey provides $1.4 to construct the part of the pipeline crossing its territory. 
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and Western help. To foster peace and stability in Eurasia, America needs 
Russian help. A modus vivendi can be reached only if Russia accepts that the 
principles of free markets, democracy, and state sovereignty take precedence 
over the outdated geopolitical practices of the past century."212 This approach can 
and should dominate and can even be seen as the part of the US "win-win" 
paradigm. 
Another actor in the region - Iran - is less cooperative and the US 
sanctions against Tehran thus remain in power and this actor cannot be seen 
within the win-win framework proposed by the United States. Ambassador 
Elizabeth Jones described the US-Iranian relations as "nothing has changed."213 
Many American analysts and energy companies hold that détente with Iran 
would change the whole balance in the region and contribute in the end to the 
peaceful South Caucasus without any alignments and opposing groups of 
countries. However, even if Iran gives up supporting terrorism and drops its 
nuclear ambitions and if the commercial interests of the US dominate eventually 
over its geopolitical ones, Washington should pursue such kind of cooperation 
without making Azerbaijan a victim of US-Iranian détente. Any possible Iranian 
route (even if it is a remote future) should be accomplished if the South 
Caucasian alternative (like BTC line) is already implemented.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The only way out for the US active involvement in the region is to be 
involved there within the multilateral framework. That does not mean the 
necessity for the US to carry out all the kinds of its activities within the PfP, 
NATO, OSCE or UN framework. It does mean, however, that the US should 
elaborate on security alliances that will remain in Central Eurasia after the anti-
terrorist campaign in order to bring more security to the whole region, including 
South Caucasus. Also, the multinational element of the oil and gas companies 
operating in the region should be used. As Jan Bremmer wrote, "Globalizing 
Caspian will enhance the region's stability…a multinational approach recognizes 
that the role of foreign capital is critical to the survival of the states of the 
Caspian Basin. Multinational companies have more influence over Caspian 
leaders than do many of their parent governments."214 
The US should combine both military/security and economic/commercial 
means to enhance such globalization and internationalization. On the other hand, 
unilateral approach would lack legitimacy and would only bring more enemies to 
the US drawing dangerous line between alignments present here and entailing 
conflicts between them. The choice must be made carefully because the 
irreversible character of the US engagement in the region is out of question and 
the possible outcome depends on how Washington would use the strengths it 
possesses to fill in the power vacuum and contribute to the regional stability. 
Summing up the whole story of the US policy in the South Caucasus one 
needs to point out two main concepts that guided this adventure: selective 
                                                 
214 Ian Bremmer, "Oil Politics: America and the Riches of the Caspian Basin," World Policy 
Journal, Spring 1998, p.34. 
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engagement and balance of power. The first approach tends to be a passive rather 
than active kind of engagement and is characterized by the lack of policy 
continuation. Moreover, the target area is considered in that case to be of 
secondary significance for the actor in question.  
The balance of power strategy means the intention to play off one group 
of the local or regional actors against the other by giving support to the weaker 
states. The outcome of such a strategy seems to be a balance between regional 
states, which would prevent any regional hegemony and, hence, be beneficial to 
the United States. Since the early 1990s till the present moment the US policy 
included more elements of selective engagement, although the elements of 
balance of power strategy were also present. "Bush and Clinton administrations 
have promoted regional cooperation and disavowed a new "Great Game." At the 
same time they have pursued what many have perceived to be a competitive 
strategy in the energy sector through the dogged advocacy of horizontal pipeline 
routes that proscribe Iran and compete with Russian pipelines."215 So, the US 
policy was a mixture of these two concepts and that was the reason why its 
objectives were often unclear and seen by other regional powers as threatening 
their interests.  
The other reason of the US inability to make the rules of its engagement 
rules clearer is lack of well-defined goals and interests. The non-defined goals of 
the engagement, especially in the early 1990s, led sometimes to a sort of 
behaviorist interactions between the US and the regional actors. The US 
                                                 
215 See Charles Fairbanks, C. Richard Nelson, S. Frederick Starr and Kenneth Weisbrode, "The 
Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia "A publication of The Atlantic Council of the United 
States and the Central Asia - Caucasus Institute, January 2001 
(http://www.cacianalyst.org/Strategic_assessment.pdf). 
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activities in the region since after the break-up of the Soviet Union were not 
supported by clear goals but only implied their existence. As Robert Cutler put it,  
It was assumed that the United States acted in a variety of 
circumstances because it supposed that it could thereby achieve a 
variety of goals. United States behavior thus created its interests in 
the minds of those concerned, who reified that behavior into 
interest, That behavior and inferred patterns engendered responses 
from other parties, to which the United States is now responding 
by redefining and refining its interests.216 
 
Such a redefinition of the US interests reached its peak in 1994 when 
engagement became more defined and was supported by some clear objectives. 
Simultaneously, the US began to distinguish between "vital" and "non-vital" 
interests and "…the category of "national interest" began to supplant that of 
"national security" in United States foreign policy-making discourse…"217 Of 
course, the US interests in the South Caucasus cannot be labeled as "vital" to US 
security. However, the importance (even if it is a "non-vital" importance) of the 
region to the US security is evident especially in the light of the last events in 
Afghanistan. If one needs to define the main US interests in the region it would 
sound like that: political stability and economic development. This broad 
definition includes: strengthening independence of the local states, containment 
of intra- and inter-state conflicts and their resolution, access to and development 
of the local energy markets, combat of WMD and narcotics proliferation, 
promotion of democratic reforms.  
All these goals and interests are compatible with each other and even can 
be seen as mutually reinforcing. For example, the US Caspian Energy Strategy is 
directed at increasing the independence of the regional states. On the other hand, 
conflict resolution is the basis for normal oil development.  
                                                 
216 See Robert M. Cutler, "US Interests and "Cooperative Security" in Abkhazia and Karabağ: 
Engagement versus Commitment?" in  Mehmet Tutuncu ed. "Caucasus: War and Peace," p.133. 
217 Ibid. 
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In conclusion, some policy recommendations should be made as regards 
the US regional policy: 
 
i. The US should pursue more active and assertive foreign policy in the 
region and stand for the commitments made. There are many examples in 
history which show how never materialized US commitment led to sad 
consequences like in the case of the Hungary-Soviet Union confrontation 
in 1956. Another example is the Vietnam War when Washington declared 
the region of Indochina as vital to the security of the United States. Of 
course, the United States is the only actor in the South Caucasian game 
that theoretically can leave it. But, on the other hand, the US engagement 
became irreversible "…for simple reasons of international prestige as 
well as for the sake of real national interests."218 Moreover, the US 
involvement is welcomed by the weak Caucasian states, which realize 
that only the US and the US-led West can provide stability and economic 
development here. 
 
ii. The US policy in the region is often misunderstood by the regional 
powers as directed against them and as pursuing clear balance of power. 
Official visits, humanitarian aid, PfP activities, and energy development 
projects - all these components of the US policy often result in confusion 
and misconceptions. So, the White House needs to clarify the benign 
                                                 
218 Svante Cornell, "Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the 
Caucasus," op cit, p.390. 
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character of its policies and show that the latter are based on cooperative 
rather that competitive model. 
iii. Attention should also be paid to the higher level of coordination of the 
US government's activities in the region. This can be achieved through 
the creation of the institutes that would oversee, analyze and show 
directions for the White House. For example, the existence of three 
governmental groups (for Foreign Policy, Commercial Energy Policy and 
Financial Policy) can be seen as positive factor in this regard. Or the 
existence of the Senior Interagency Working Group chaired by the 
National Security Council is another example of setting US policy and 
coordinating its activities. 
iv. The US-Russian relations are of great importance for the US and thus it 
needs to treat the Russian Federation as the equal partner and at the same 
time to prevent it from becoming dominant and hegemonic power in the 
Near Abroad. There are plenty of economic and geopolitical incentives 
for Russia to become such a partner and the United States needs to 
underscore them and assure the Russians that oil is not a geopolitical 
barrier but an economic opportunity. On the other hand, the notion of 
Caucasus being Russia's backyard should be eliminated. Russia lacks 
popular will and resources to turn the region into a colony again. All it 
can do is to call the South Caucasus Near Abroad and try to spoil the 
regional stability by using local conflicts. So, the United States needs to 
recognize the fact that the region's fate doesn't depend and shouldn’t 
depend on Russia only. 
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v. The strategically important (for the United States) states that seek US 
assistance in all spheres including economic, geopolitical and 
humanitarian ones, should receive this assistance. Moreover, they should 
receive the confirmation of this support on the part of Washington. The 
history shows that Georgia and Azerbaijan were not encouraged and 
supported by the US when they actually had to be. The South Caucasus is 
a shakable security complex and every misunderstanding of US intentions 
can result in the radical change of the regional system. So, the United 
States will have to make clear commitments to Georgia and Azerbaijan 
and to increase the level of cooperation with them. 
vi. The only real ally of the United States in the region - Turkey - needs to 
receive more attention and support from Washington. It is difficult to 
imagine today's degree of the US involvement without Turkey's 
participation in it.  Turkey's influence in the region increased again in the 
last couple of years and can be considered as Turkey's Second Coming. 
The First One was only partially successful because of Russia's strong 
resistance and the US passive attitude. This time Washington will have to 
give its full support to Turkey both in energy development (e.g., Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan) and in geopolitical matters (e.g. increased military 
cooperation between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan). The Turkish 
factor also opens the Muslim world for the United States and gives 
Washington the opportunity to build important connections through 
Turkey, Caucasus and Central Asia with the Muslim countries and open 
societies there. 
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 All in all, given Washington's position in the international relations' 
system as the only remaining superpower the US policies have surely created the 
framework of rules within which the local and neighboring states could act. As 
Zbigniew Brzezinski put it in his "The Grand Chessboard," "America is too 
distant to be dominant in this part of Eurasia but too powerful not to be 
engaged."219  The United States' strategic engagement in the South Caucasus will 
undoubtedly continue and increase with time in its range. The engagement is in 
favor not only of the United States itself, but also in that of the regional security, 
local states and neighboring big powers.  
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